

CHINA WINS TERROR WAR? ■ TOM FRIEDMAN FALLS FLAT

JUNE 20, 2005

The American Conservative

HOLLYWOOD:



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HUMANITY TO ANIMALS

I cannot remember being as deliriously surprised as I was by Matthew Scully's story on farmed animals (May 23).

I am not a vegetarian. I was raised on a farm before factory farming. We ate animals, but only after they had lived a normal, happy, outdoor life.

There is something ugly and repulsive in recognizing the meat on my plate came right out of these merciless holocausts (with apologies to WWII survivors), from helpless and wretched animals that have never lived a single decent day.

It would seem highly unlikely that employees (mostly illegals) working daily in such ghastly surroundings could ever maintain even minimum standards of humanity.

This story was a magnificent reminder that conservatives are capable of much more than naked greed.

DUANE TOLPINGRUD
Seattle, Wash.

SMITHFIELD CARES

I was deeply disappointed in your cover story, "Fear Factories." It painted a false and highly inaccurate picture of animal treatment at Smithfield Foods.

The article misleads your readers by mischaracterizing our well established and widely respected animal-welfare practices. In 2002, Murphy-Brown, our swine production subsidiary, developed our Animal Welfare Management System (AWMS), a set of policies and practices that governs how we care for our animals. We are very proud of our AWMS, and with good reason. It has been widely recognized as the most comprehensive animal-welfare program in the industry.

Everyone at Smithfield Foods and Murphy-Brown takes every action possible to provide our animals an environment that is consistent with their needs. Furthermore, our AWMS makes certain that our animals are safe, comfortable, and healthy. Not only is that the humane thing to do, but if we treated animals as the author describes, it would dramati-

cally reduce production, which he tries to lead everyone to believe falsely is the be all, end all for our company. Many of his conclusions are based on dated and fabricated information.

DENNIS H. TREACY

Vice President, Environmental,
Community and Government Affairs
Smithfield Foods, Inc.
Smithfield, Va.

Matthew Scully replies:

I wonder if Smithfield would be willing to allow unannounced inspections of its facilities by veterinarians of the Humane Society of the U.S., and perhaps some reporters and camera crews as well, so that we can all see these factory-farming methods of which the company is so proud. Inside those barbed-wire fences that surround many Smithfield farms, Mr. Treacy could then demonstrate for us how "safe, comfortable, and healthy" pigs are when they are mutilated, confined all of their lives in narrow metal crates, hauled in overcrowded trucks, and killed at a pace of 32,000 a day at just one Smithfield slaughterhouse. The problem here—setting aside Mr. Treacy's vague and hollow assurances—is factory farming itself, which treats animals in ways that would warrant felony cruelty charges if done to a dog or cat. The methods of factory farming are low, amoral, and merciless, and by those measures alone has Smithfield set the standard for the industry.

GAY MARRIAGE MATTERS

Stephen Baskerville is right to point to the negative consequences of unilateral divorce law on children and families (May 23). But he is wrong to imply that because unilateral divorce has already weakened marriage, same-sex marriage is relatively unimportant.

No one has spoken out more vigorously than I on the need for divorce-law reform or the damage divorce does. But same-sex marriage represents an even greater threat than unilateral divorce, a more basic repudiation of virtually universal norms. Same-sex marriage rep-

resents a final and decisive rejection by our government of the idea that marriage is in some fundamental way connected to babies, or that connecting babies to their own mothers and fathers is part of its critical work.

I was 11 when the no-fault divorce revolution swept over America. But same-sex marriage is happening on our watch. This may not be the marriage battle I would wish to be fighting. But it is the one we are in. We do no service by attempting to persuade Americans that the fight to preserve our historic understanding of marriage is a diversion from divorce-law reform.

MAGGIE GALLAGHER

Institute for Marriage and Public Policy
via e-mail

Stephen Baskerville replies:

I never said that same-sex marriage is unimportant. But it is a symptom, not a cause, and would not be an issue but for the larger severing of family ties not only by the culture but also by the state.

This evisceration of traditional marriage through divorce (and welfare) is the principal argument used by gay-marriage advocates, and one opponents cannot answer except by having the courage to take up the challenge. The divorce revolution may have begun three decades ago, but it is not over. The fallout is being felt today, precisely in the emergence of same-sex marriage, plus fatherless children, social ills, and now assaults on parental freedom that affect millions more people much more directly.

An effective defense of marriage and family must confront not only divorce, but government's war against parents generally and fathers in particular.

The American Conservative welcomes letters to the editor. Submit by e-mail to letters@amconmag.com, by fax to 703-875-3350, or by mail to 1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA 22209. Please include your name, address, and phone number. We reserve the right to edit all correspondence for space and clarity.

REUTERS PHOTO ARCHIVE



[COVER]

Left Coast's Right Turn

BY STEVE SAILER Hollywood stars may vote Democratic, but the movies they make are surprisingly conservative. **Page 7**

[STRATEGY]

The Next Superpower?

BY LEON HADAR America's imperial overstretch could pave the way for China's rise to global hegemony. **Page 10**

[ESPIONAGE]

State of the State Secrets

BY JUSTIN RAIMONDO Larry Franklin wanted to sway American's Iran policy, not just spill intel. **Page 15**

[POLITICS]

Border Skirmishes

BY W. JAMES ANTLE III The immigration debate pits the Republican leadership against grassroots conservatives. **Page 21**

COVER ILLUSTRATION: CHRIS HIERS

COLUMNS

6 Patrick J. Buchanan: John McCain's Gang of Seven

27 Fred Reed: How to read and what

35 Taki: The *Post's* leaky journalism

NEWS & VIEWS

4 Fourteen Days: Why They Hate Us; Dateline: Krakow, Portugal; Larry Summers's Payback

11 Deep Background: Baghdad's Real-Time Bombs; Soft-Target Syria; They All Look Alike to Me

ARTICLES

13 Andrew J. Bacevich: Refighting the Good War avails nothing.

17 Doug Bandow: South Korea is a faithless friend.

19 Gregory Cochran: Eisenhower knew how to run a war—or not.

23 Arthur Versluis: Have we witnessed the death of the Left?

ARTS & LETTERS

28 James P. Pinkerton: *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century* by Thomas L. Friedman

30 George W. Carey: *Betrand de Jouvenel: The Conservative Liberal and the Illusions of Modernity* by Daniel J. Mahoney

33 Ralph de Toledano: Pablo Casals, a cellist and a Catalan

[MEDIA]

SCAPEGOATING NEWSWEEK

If it weren't so serious, the *Newsweek* tempest would be amusing. The Bush administration concluded that the weekly's anonymously sourced and now world-famous item alleging Koran abuse as a Guantanamo interrogation technique was responsible for deadly rioting throughout Afghanistan. "People are dead because of what this son of a bitch said," said Pentagon spokesman Larry DiRita, and poor *Newsweek* suffered the wrath of the entire War Party.


The need for scapegoats when things are not going well is universal, and we empathize with the desire of these naïve soldiers for democracy to lash out at someone. But maybe, just maybe, the rage that spills over in anti-American riots has something to do not just with the Koran but with an invasion that has killed 100,000 Iraqis, Abu Ghraib, American policies in Israel, etc. If Bush and his handlers are so foolish as to be unable to perceive that Muslim societies, flawed as they may be, are pretty intense in resisting foreign occupation and that there might be deeper reasons for Muslim anger than *Newsweek*, the occupants of the White House are more foolish than we believed.

[POLITICS]

GALLOWAY FOR SENATE

Forceful, articulate, firm in his principles, British MP George Galloway was everything an American politician is not in his testimony before the Senate subcommittee investigating the oil-for-food scandal. Galloway stood accused of profiting from oil deals with Saddam Hussein, but he rapidly turned the tables on Norm Coleman, the senator presiding over the hearing.

"I have never seen a barrel of oil, owned one, bought one, sold one, and neither has anybody on my behalf," Galloway said, before testifying that he met



"REALLY FRESHENS THE PLACE UP, HUH?!"

with Saddam "exactly as many times as Donald Rumsfeld has met with him." "The difference is," said Galloway, "Donald Rumsfeld met to sell him guns and give him maps. I met him to try and bring about an end to sanctions, suffering and war, and on the second occasion, I met him to try and persuade him to allow Hans Blix and U.N. inspectors back into the country."

The fierce style of debate that survives in the British parliament fosters the kind of forensic skills on display in Galloway's testimony, but there is more to him than that. Galloway's unyielding criticisms of Tony Blair and the Iraq War outstripped even British standards, earning him expulsion from the Labour Party—which failed to stop him from returning to Parliament this year on a small-party ticket.

There is much about Galloway that is not admirable, from his thoroughly pink domestic politics to his laudatory remarks to Saddam Hussein in 1994—words he says he regrets—but for all that, the U.S. could use a few legislators with half his conviction and eloquence.

[ECONOMY]

THIS ITEM WAS NOT WRITTEN IN BANGALORE

Outsourcing is something that happens to other people—isn't it? Even as manufacturing and programming jobs ship out, globalists assure Americans that jobs creating "content" will remain. But tell that to the journalists at Reuters whose liveli-

hoods are on the brink of leaving for Singapore and India. The news agency has begun outsourcing editing and caption-writing to the Far East, over the protests of the journalists' union.

Once again, however, outsourcing proves not to be cost-cutting panacea companies expect. In this case, using cheap foreign labor has led Reuters into such errors as identifying the Polish city of Krakow as being in ... Portugal. But don't blame the boys from Bangalore—after all, Reuters executives evidently cannot tell the difference between India and America.

[EDUCATION]

SUMMERS'S PENANCE

"Lawrence H. Summers, the embattled president of Harvard University, announced that the university would spend at least \$50 million to restore his reputation." That's how the story should have read. Instead, the *New York Times* reported that Harvard will be writing a \$50 million check "to recruit, support and promote women and members of underrepresented minority groups on its faculty." This after Summers was nearly tossed from the ivory tower for telling the truth: women are less represented in math and science departments. Worse, he suggested that some "intrinsic aptitude" might be at work.

By challenging the central tenet of the egalitarian creed, Summers exposed one of liberalism's ugly secrets: advancing diversity means lowering standards.

The backlash was fierce, Summers quickly recanted, and now Harvard is paying for his candor. The greatest toll, however, will fall on students when their professors are hired not on the basis of excellence alone but because they can decipher differential equations while wearing skirts.

[CULTURE]

BEYOND BELIEF

Speaking of Harvard, there may be no atheists in foxholes, but there are plenty at the country's oldest university. The curious part is that they practice organized areligion, with a Humanist Chaplain for Atheistic and Agnostic Students.

This summer, Chaplain Thomas Ferrick is stepping down after 30 years in the pulpit (?) to be replaced by Greg Epstein, the assistant humanist chaplain, ensuring that Harvard's heathens maintain a clear channel to, well, nothing.

A former Catholic priest who turned in his collar over disagreement with the Church's teaching on birth control, Ferrick told the *Boston Globe* that he's actually one of 10 humanist chaplains across the country: "In the midst of all of this revival of religiosity, and with the rise of the evangelical right, the voice of secular ethics and secular rationality has been somewhat obscured."

While it would seem that being *ex ecclesia* would be the secularists' desired state, their need to constitute a godless church hints at the loneliness of unbelief. And Ferrick's admission that just 20 undergraduates are active in the Secular Society he founded suggests that there may yet be room for God and man at Harvard.

[BUDGET]

EMPIRE IN THE RED

Few empires bleed out on the battlefield. Most corrode from within, and while the U.S. might deem itself an exception to history because our hege-

mony is benevolent, the balance sheets tell another story.

According to a new report from the Congressional Budget Office, by 2010, the War on Terror will have cost \$600 billion. Iraqi operations alone sap \$5 billion per month—despite neoconservative claims prior to the invasion that Iraq's oil would fund its reconstruction.

The Republican Congress is still signing checks, having recently passed an \$82 billion supplemental defense bill, and shows no sign of capping its pen—despite a gaping federal budget deficit. Even as the economy falters, the White House assures that we can still do it all: reform Social Security, leave no child behind, absorb millions of "guests," and rule the world. They forget that government has no money of its own.

[IMMIGRATION]

CRIMINALS=CITIZENS CITIZENS=VIGILANTES

Following its success at publicizing the border-security crisis in Arizona, in August the Minuteman Project will turn to California. In a state that has long been burdened by unchecked illegal immigration, many residents will be grateful for these efforts—including Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, who has praised the Minutemen and signaled they would be welcome. "I think they've done a terrific job," he said in a recent interview.

Not all Californians will be so welcoming. Los Angeles Mayor-elect Antonio Villaraigosa has come out against the Minutemen. The director of one immigration advocacy group accused Schwarzenegger of pandering to "racism" while a state legislator took the Bush line that the governor was supporting "vigilantism."

To the critics, a vast influx of illegal aliens is something that can be tolerated, but volunteers who report violations of the law to the border patrol—and the politicians who encourage them—are somehow suspect. ■

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Fili-busted

With the Republican Senate just 24 hours away from liberating all seven judicial hostages of Harry Reid and his Democrats, John McCain stepped in to

snatch compromise from the jaws of victory.

We will, said McCain, settle for three. McCain's Gang of Seven just engineered a Republican Munich.

As of last Monday, Majority Leader Frist had the 51 votes needed to free all seven. Had a cloture vote been taken, all seven Bush appellate court nominees would soon be on their way to the federal bench. Harry Reid's Democratic minority would have been stripped permanently of its power to abuse, delay, and kill Bush judges and future Supreme Court justices.

After months of painstaking work and press abuse, Republicans were on the precipice of a triumph. The McCain Seven stepped in—to trade the horse for a rabbit.

Now, instead of Republicans winning all seven and disarming Reid, Kennedy & Co. of their illegitimate weapon, Democrats agreed to release three hostages, but hold the other four, with a GOP blessing to use their filibuster-veto in "extraordinary circumstances," i.e., should Bush name to the Supreme Court a jurist like Rehnquist, Scalia, or Clarence Thomas.

McCain is doing victory laps on the talk shows and assuring us, "The country won." But Dick Durbin and Reid are talking like men who just rubbed GOP noses in the dirt. "The nuclear option is off the table," says Sen. Durbin. Reid was especially gracious: "Abuse of power will not be tolerated. And your attempt ... to trample the Constitution and grab absolute control are over."

As of now, the winners are McCain, who has burnished his credentials with liberals, Democrats, and the mainstream media, who will lacquer up any Republican who sells out the Right. The losers are Bill Frist, the Republican majority, the four abandoned nominees, now back in limbo again, and George W. Bush.

In a shot at the president, South Carolina's Lindsey Graham, who appears to look to McCain as his future leader rather than Bush as his present leader, said, "We're going to start talking about who would be a good judge and who wouldn't. And the White House is going to get more involved and they are going to listen to us more."

Not only did Graham dump his party to go with the Gang of Seven and collude with Democrats, he gave credence to the liberal charge that some Bush nominees are indeed beyond the pale.

Graham should state which conservative jurist Bush named who would not be a "good judge." If he believes Bush has failed to consult, or appointed unqualified men or women, why not vote them down rather than let liberal obstructionists keep a lethal weapon to kill Republican Supreme Court nominees?

What McCain has done is to cobble together a small but controlling block of dissident Republicans to deny the GOP majority its right to rule and run the Senate, except on John McCain's terms.

This is a direct challenge to Bill Frist. If he and the GOP majority accept the McCain Compromise, they will invite the bitter contempt of the people who

sent them here with a conservative mandate. At the top of that agenda is remaking the federal courts and terminating the Supreme Court's 50-year reign as dictatorial agent of social, cultural, and moral revolution in America.

What ought Frist to do?

Hold a press conference and declare to the party and country that, while the McCain Compromise may bind the seven, it does not bind the Senate, and, as majority leader, he intends to give every judicial nominee to come out of the Judiciary Committee a floor vote. Should any nominee be filibustered, he will move to invoke cloture and shut off debate.

If McCain's Gang of Seven wishes to vote with 45 Democrats to let judicial nominees be filibuster-vetoed, that is their right. But they will have to vote with Reid, Boxer, and Kennedy and against their fellow Republicans and President Bush.

McCain has thrown down a challenge to Bush as well. Before Monday the Democratic minority was dictating which judges would be held hostage and which ones released. Now it is the Democratic minority, plus the McCain Seven.

What Bush should reply is: there is not an extremist among these nominees. All are men and women of integrity, intelligence, and judicial demeanor. I want them all voted up or voted down. To deny them a vote is to do them and this nation an injustice.

If the president and Frist move toughly, and together, they can scatter the McCain gang, get every judge voted on, and disarm the Democrats of their lethal weapon.

They have the votes. The question is, do they have the nerve? ■

[Mr. Smith goes to Hollywood]

Left Coast's Right Turn

The stars' politics aside, Tinseltown reinforces conservative values.

By Steve Sailer

THE FEDERAL ELECTION Commission's online database of political donors amusingly confirms that the movie industry is as one-sidedly Democratic as the stereotypes claim. Oscar-winning actors and directors give about 40 times as much to Democrats as to Republicans. Hollywood's Republican donors turn out to be mostly aged actors for whom the threat "you'll never work in this town again" long ago lost its terror. Over the last decade, stalwart Republican campaign contributors have included Jane Russell, who starred in Howard Hughes's 1943 Western "The Outlaw"; Yvette Mimieux, who played Weena the Eloi in the 1960 "Time Machine"; and sword-and-sandal star Victor Mature, who got so mature he's now dead. (Yet almost all politician-actors, such as Ronald Reagan and Arnold Schwarzenegger, have been in the GOP, which suggests voters appreciate that just being a Republican in Hollywood demonstrates strength of character.)

The right wing of the chorus of the perpetually indignant has repeatedly gone on the warpath against Hollywood for political crimes real and imagined, recently excoriating actress Maggie Gyllenhaal ("Secretary") for her brief criticism of American foreign policy and denouncing George Lucas for perhaps alluding unadmirably to George W. Bush in "Star Wars: Episode III—Revenge of the Sith." But the

actual relationship between Hollywood and politics turns out to be convoluted and often surprising.

Hollywood was not always so ideologically homogeneous. Consider one of the best films of the industry's best year, 1939—"Mr. Smith Goes to Washington." Leading man Jimmy Stewart, director Frank Capra, and studio head Harry Cohn were all Republicans, while its screenwriter Sidney Buchman was a card-carrying Stalinist. Today, though, acceptable views run the gamut all the way from Eleanor Roosevelt Democrats like Barbra Streisand on the Left to Harry Truman Democrats like Tom Hanks (who named a son "Truman") on the Right. What happened?

Keep in mind that Hollywood's relationship with the outside world is tenuous. It's a self-absorbed community, and its politics are skin-deep, serving functions within the industry that aren't always obvious to outsiders. Today's liberal monoculture is in large part an outgrowth of the compromise resolution to the ancient struggle between studio executives and screenwriters that culminated in the endlessly discussed but little understood blacklist of Marxists in the 1950s.

One of the blacklist's main roots has disappeared down the memory hole because it doesn't burnish the heroic image created to flatter the Communist victims. A 1919 theater strike won the

playwrights of the Dramatists Guild the right to retain copyright in their works. To this day, dramatists own their plays and merely license them to producers. Further, they have the right to approve or reject the cast, director, and any proposed changes in the dialogue. Contractually, a playwright is a rugged individualist, an Ayn Rand hero.

With the introduction of the talkies in 1927, Hollywood began importing trainloads of New York dramatists. Salaries were generous and the climate superb, but the dramatists found the collaborative nature of moviemaking frustrating, even demeaning. Screenwriters were employees in a vast factory, which owned their creations. The studios could, and generally would, have other hired hacks radically rewrite each script, all under the intrusive supervision of some mogul's semiliterate brother-in-law.

In the 1930s, Hollywood's Communist Party, under the command of its charismatic commissar, screenwriter John Howard Lawson, improbably but enthusiastically championed the intellectual property rights of scriptwriters. The ink-stained wretches found that the Marxist concept of alienation described their plight. They felt just like the once psychologically fulfilled hand-craftsmen forced into becoming dispossessed factory drones who cannot recognize their creativity in their employer's output.

Insanely ironic as it seems now, many screenwriters became Communists because they despised the movie business's need for co-operation. How turning command of the entire economy over to a dictatorship would restore the unfettered joys of individual craftsmanship was a little fuzzy, but, hey, if you couldn't trust Stalin, whom could you trust?

The possibility of studios blacklisting writers first surfaced in the 1930s, when the moguls' cartel turned aside the leftist screenwriters' push to align themselves with the Dramatists League by threatening to fire union supporters. "It wouldn't be a blacklist because it would all be done over the telephone," Jack Warner explained.

Decades later, after the formal blacklist era, this labor-management conflict was resolved by a tacit compromise. The blacklisted writers were elevated in the collective memory to the role of martyrs. Their leftism (but not their Stalinism, which was conveniently forgotten) was enshrined as the appropriate ideology of all respectable movie-folk. In return, the producers hung on to their property rights in screenplays.

In the wake of Mel Gibson's vast profits from "The Passion of the Christ," the industry finally senses that it's out of touch with much of its potential audience. Yet it can hardly be relied upon to figure out what it is doing wrong. If conservatives want to watch conservative movies, we will have to make them ourselves.

But much of what passes for conservatism in the Bush era is stridently prosaic, dogmatic, and anti-artistic. The "primarily political people," as culture blogger Michael Blowhard calls them, who now dominate the public voice of the Right deplore the imagination and empathy required to make good films.

Indeed, the movies are far less obsessed with politics than the right-wing media is, in part due to the years it takes modern free-agent Hollywood to

put deals together. If Hanks would suggest to Steven Spielberg, who has given hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Democrats, that they undermine the Republican campaign against the filibuster by remaking "Mr. Smith," which famously climaxes with the haggard Jefferson Smith trying to keep speaking against a corrupt bill, by the time they got their movie finished the Democrats might have regained control of the Senate and might be quashing Republican filibusters.

To those of us who care about more than partisan politics, however, the Hollywood of 2005 in some ways confirms historian Robert Conquest's first law: Everyone is conservative about what he knows best. The mainstream audience restrains Hollywood's leftist affectations, and the vicissitudes of making movies teach filmmakers hard-headed lessons in how the world really works, making the actual politics in the movies closer to Tom Hanks's than Michael Moore's.

THE VICISSITUDES OF MAKING MOVIES TEACH FILMMAKERS HARD-HEADED LESSONS IN HOW THE WORLD REALLY WORKS.

Contemporary Hollywood movies approve of manly men and womanly women, guns, violence in self-defense, anti-drug laws, true love, marriage, big weddings, big houses, and moms and dads spending time with their kids. The worst sin is parental adultery, because Hollywood's target audience of teens dreads anything that could break up their homes. And film heroines don't have abortions.

Many of the right-wing attacks on Hollywood stem from it not toeing the pseudo-conservative line of worshipping some of the less conservative forces in history, such as war, *laissez faire*, and George W. Bush. Movies such as Oliver Stone's "Platoon," Steven Spielberg's "Saving Private Ryan," and Mel Gibson's

"We Were Soldiers" have done America a service by taking war films to a new level of bloody realism. While neoconservative jingoes have worried that revealing the effects of combat too honestly will induce second thoughts about World War IV, veterans have typically been pleased that moviegoers can now get a better sense of the sacrifices they made in the service of their country. Nor is it Hollywood's fault that the Bush administration didn't learn anything about the dangers of occupying a Muslim country from "Black Hawk Down," the minutely detailed 2001 depiction of our Special Forces' desperate battle in Somalia.

As lavishly paid members of the private sector, filmmakers admire public sector workers, such as soldiers, cops, and firemen, who risk their lives for the kind of annual pay that a Beverly Hills matron might spend on *feng shui* consultations. For example, Hanks passed up tens of millions in movie earnings to

produce a patriotic miniseries about the GIs of World War II and the astronauts and engineers of the space race.

There are few conservatives in Hollywood, but at least there aren't many neo-conservatives either. When the GOP wanted to feature a movie star at the 2004 convention in New York, the best the party could come up with was Ron Silver, who once played, uh ... c'mon, Google ... Alan Dershowitz in "Reversal of Fortune."

And if movies tend to be skeptical that unbridled capitalism automatically produces the utopia foreseen by University of Chicago economists, well, filmmakers have all had some first-hand experience with just how far human beings will go to get rich. In Capra's "It's

a *Wonderful Life*,” George Bailey rages at the subterfuges of the banker, Mr. Potter, not because Capra was a pinko but because the director had similarly raged at his own boss Harry Cohn’s nefariousness.

Cinema, a medium of the visible, is innately ill suited for explaining the wonders of the invisible hand. But the movie’s basic message about business—that the magic of the market is no substitute for individuals making moral choices—isn’t necessarily anti-conservative. Capitalism is a terrific system, but it doesn’t absolve capitalists from the need for ethics.

Nor is it anti-conservative for film people to believe that they should occasionally make a quality film that might not be as profitable as most of the dreck they churn out. If the market was the measure of all things, three studios wouldn’t have gotten together and invested close to \$200 million in “*Master and Commander*,” 2003’s splendid, but not terribly lucrative, realization of Patrick O’Brian’s superb and deeply conservative seafaring novels.

As the deplorable quality of 2005 releases underscores, this resistance to pure profit-maximizing behavior is disappearing in Hollywood, but if conservatism means more than just the worship of the free market, that’s not a good thing.

Hollywood has so far resisted the efficiency urge, the Wal-Martization that has swept much of American industry. For example, in one studio’s parking garage, about 20 identical white Honda CR-Vs slowly gather dust, each with Will Smith’s picture painted on the rear window. Why? Perhaps somebody thought spending half a million dollars would amuse the star and incline him to make a movie with them again. The tomfoolery, the raw waste allowed in Hollywood nourishes artistic minds. And who is to say that Wal-Mart is the final arbiter of conservatism?

Also, Hollywood is a union town in a traditionally anti-union metropolis, and while that makes industry workers more Democratic, it also has paradoxically conservative effects. The creative artists’ unions such as the Writers Guild keep the movies from being an utterly death-or-glory business like the music industry, where countless wannabes work for years for almost nothing in the hopes of becoming one of the few superstars. The

kung-fu fighters. As it has been in American popular culture since Stephen Foster and *Huckleberry Finn*, the movies portray America as still a white and black nation.

Going back to 1967’s Best Picture winner “*In the Heat of the Night*” with Rod Steiger and Sidney Poitier, which launched the genre of white cop/black cop buddy movies, films have often promoted integration smartly by showing

THE MOVIE AND TV UNIONS ARE PRETTY MUCH ALL THAT’S KEEPING WHAT’S LEFT OF LA’S AMERICAN-BORN BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS FROM BEING DRIVEN OUT OF CALIFORNIA.

film guilds help those who have made it into the inner circle stay there long enough to raise a family.

At the blue-collar level, the Teamsters—the most Republican-leaning union—are widely despised as lazy gold-brickers, but most of the other crafts unions are considered team players whose members, while generously paid, are competent and hustle when needed.

A production company recently rented my front yard to shoot a few seconds of a beer commercial, my mongrel lawn being deemed more like that of the average American beer drinker’s than the posh landscaping of my entertainment-industry neighbors. About 60 technicians swarmed all over my street, the great majority of them white males, a proportion normally unheard of in Southern California, where so much of the blue-collar work is done by illegal immigrants. The movie and TV unions are pretty much all that’s keeping what’s left of LA’s American-born blue-collar workers from being driven out of California by illegal aliens willing to undercut their wages.

In Hollywood’s imagination, America isn’t really a multicultural nation. The new immigrants are shunted aside to play clichés, with Hispanics symbolizing family values and Asians restricted to

the two races learning to work together in conservative institutions such as the police, the military, or the football team. It’s easier to persuade people of different races to like each other as a by-product of having a common goal outside of themselves—fighting crime, winning the war, beating the arch-rival team—than by just nagging them to be sensitive towards each other.

In contrast to Hollywood’s leftist politics, which have been in stasis for decades, its increasingly moderate values reflect more recent trends, such as the clean-living fad that emerged in reaction to the Great Hollywood Snowstorm of roughly 1975-1985. As cocaine laid waste to a brilliant generation of filmmakers, the Boy Scout of the bunch, Steven Spielberg—who as a lad had earned more than twice the number of merit badges required to make Eagle Scout—went on to stupendous success.

Similarly, the top stars of recent years—such as Tom Cruise, Arnold Schwarzenegger, and Harrison Ford—are highly disciplined professionals who can be counted on to establish a harmonious atmosphere on the set and market the product relentlessly in the media. A hothead can make it to the highest rank only if he is as talented as Russell Crowe.

While television has been getting more sex-obsessed, movies have been getting cleaner, especially since the 2000 congressional hearings that finally scared the movie theaters into not letting unaccompanied kids into R-rated movies. As conservative critic Michael Medved had long predicted, Hollywood's subsequent move away from R-rated films proved a financial boon.

Feminism gets no more than lip service in Hollywood. Films are ever more male-oriented because, unlike TV, they are not advertiser-supported. Marketers want women because men transfer roughly a trillion dollars per year of earnings to women to spend, but males buy the majority of movie tickets. The studios try to justify the proliferation in movies of butt-kicking babes and girls-with-guns as female empowerment gestures, but they are actually there because nerds get a charge out of catfights.

Similarly, most of the violent criminals in movies are white not because filmmakers hate whites, but because, as Tom Wolfe pointed out in *The Bonfire of the Vanities*, white people find the preponderance of minorities among arrestees to be depressing and tedious. Films feature what Wolfe called the Great White Defendant because audiences find, say, the hyper-sophisticated Hannibal the Cannibal more fun to hate than the typical real-life murderer.

Finally, while the film industry is gayer than the aerospace or coal businesses, it's much less gay than Broadway, perhaps because gay actors find it hard to work without applause from a live audience.

In summary, to get movies we like, conservatives will have to make them ourselves. But we won't be any good at it unless we understand why Hollywood does what it does. ■

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The Next Superpower?

How China could win the War on Terror

By Leon Hadar

LONG BEFORE Runaway Bride Jennifer Wilbanks, there was Runaway Bestseller Paul Kennedy. It's difficult to imagine that once upon a time in American life—before Paris Hilton had been conceived and when the term “public intellectual” wasn't yet associated with Ann Coulter—a Yale history professor who published a long, footnoted study could be transformed into a media star. But when his book on the sexy topic of the overstretching and overspending of superpowers, with its breezy title, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1550 to 2000*, was published in 1987, Kennedy became an instant celebrity among the chattering class.

All this happened before the age of 24/7 cable news, so the debate over Kennedy's deep thoughts was confined to the *New York Times*' op-ed page, NPR, public television, and frequent quoting in diplomatic receptions in Washington. Not that many people actually read the heavy *Rise and Fall*. In fact, when then *New Republic* editor Michael Kinsley conducted an experiment to find out whether Washingtonians really read Big Books, he left notes hidden in the last few pages in several copies of Kennedy's tome in an Olsson's bookstore and promised \$50 to any reader who contacted him. Kinsley didn't lose a lot of money.

But even if few actually read *Rise and Fall*, there is no doubt that Kennedy's thesis had a huge impact on the policy debate, giving birth to a catchphrase—“imperial overstretch.” Kennedy warned that the expensive military standoff between the United States and the Soviet

Union could hasten the decline of both superpowers. He posed a dilemma: a nation's military strength rests on its economic strength, but economic strength tends to wither when a nation devotes too many resources to the military. Kennedy warned of the danger of the United States bankrupting itself through military overextension, which could erode its economic performance *vis-à-vis* demilitarized Japan and Germany.

The prophecy proved to be true when the Soviet Union collapsed a few years later. But even after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Kennedy continued to criticize American defense-driven growth, rising federal debt, and lack of a Japanese-style industrial policy. He warned that unless the United States changed its course, the winners of the Cold War would be Japan and Germany, which were not saddled with gigantic military budgets and had adopted goal-oriented economic strategies.

Then came Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Japanese stagflation, German reunification, America's high-tech boom, stock-market euphoria, and disappearing budget deficits. Kennedy and his “declinists” were run over by Francis Fukuyama and his End of History crowd. Hey, buddy, America won the Cold War. Smell the coffee, do some day trading and count yourself a winner.

Not so fast. It is quite possible that the Roaring Nineties, when Silicon Valley exploded and the American stock market soared to the stratosphere, could end up a brief intermezzo in what history may recall as America's symphony of decline. In fact, if one refrains from applying one-

size-fits-all determinism in employing Kennedy's thesis, one comes to the conclusion that whether a great power rises and falls depends very much on the economic and military choices its leaders make. There is no doubt that the Cold War consumed treasure and lives of both the United States and the Soviet Union. But the reason that the United States won and the Soviet Union lost is that America's free-market economy and its political institutions were more successful in adapting themselves to powerful technological changes. After the Soviet Union disappeared, America could rise because of falling defense spending, accelerating economic growth, and the revolution in military technology. That Chalmers Johnson proved to be wrong when he concluded, "The Cold War is over, and Japan won," had to do with the failure of Japan boosters to understand that Japan's industrial policy was actually eroding its ability to compete with an American economy pulled ahead by exploding entrepreneurship. In a way, the Cold War was over, and Microsoft won.

Microsoft and other high-tech companies making America the envy of the world had to do with the fact that the Cold War had ended and a decision was made to start reducing U.S. military commitments and converting more resources to the flourishing private sector. To put it differently, if the neo-conservative approach to national security, highlighted in Paul Wolfowitz's 1992 Pentagon memorandum—proposing that the United States maintain global hegemony and never permit any nation, including Russia, Germany, Japan, and China, to rise even to the status of regional superpower—would have been adopted at that time, never-ending defense spending aimed at supporting an overstretched imperial project would have made less likely the American economic boom of the 1990s. Similarly, a

Pentagon reports that the Iraqi insurgent leadership, including al-Qaeda-linked Jordanian terrorist Abu Mu'sab al-Zarqawi, held meetings in Syria six weeks ago to discuss strategy are considered poorly sourced by other parts of the intelligence community. According to the Defense Department, Zarqawi was unhappy with the progress of the insurgency and advocated the increased use of car bombings. In the month of May, after the date of the reported meeting, 21 car bombs were detonated in Baghdad alone, compared to about 30 car bombs in Baghdad for all of last year. It is believed that the car bombs are now made in real time, close to the time of attack and near the location where they are used. Although there is no shortage of *jihadi* volunteers, in some instances there is evidence of coercion, such as the right foot being duct-taped to the vehicle's accelerator. While State Department intelligence and CIA do not dispute the intensification of terrorist attacks, some analysts believe that the Pentagon has a fixation on Damascus's involvement and is relying on questionable evidence to support the claim that the insurgency meetings took place inside Syria.



Because confronting the genuine regional threat posed by Iran would be too challenging, there appears to be a broadly based co-ordinated effort by the administration to ratchet up the pressure on soft target Syria instead.

Condoleezza Rice's comments that Syria is not doing enough to control the border area and prevent *jihadi* infiltration is part of the effort, although intelligence supporting her claim is somewhat subjective and has not been substantiated. Her comments conflict with those of former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, who recently praised Damascus's co-operation in interdicting jihadis trying to cross into Iraq. Syrian military units reportedly blocked the escape routes of suspected militants when they were cornered by U.S. Marines during recent intense fighting in Qaim, though many managed to flee using difficult-to-control smugglers' routes.



The U.S. military in Iraq claimed May's Operation Matador in the border town Qaim killed more than 125 insurgents,

but the battle appears to have been a disaster for local tribes and may well end up discouraging Iraqi communities from assisting American and Iraqi security forces in the future. The 1,000 U.S. troops were not able to distinguish between the insurgents and the Iraqi townspeople, so they blew up buildings to create fields of fire and shot at everyone. The incursion began after two Iraqi tribes reported the presence of foreign jihadis who were threatening the local villagers whenever the latter refused to give them food or follow their orders. When some incidents led to fighting, the tribesmen secretly appealed to the Iraqi Defense Ministry for assistance. U.S. Marines supported by Iraqi troops concentrated on the area and Operation Matador was launched, but the offensive ended up flattening major parts of Qaim and causing significant casualties among the local residents. It was admittedly nearly impossible to distinguish friend from foe in the middle of the battle, but Iraq's villagers now know what to expect when they ask Baghdad for help.

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decision by George H.W. Bush to follow the neoconservatives' advice to invade Baghdad and oust Saddam Hussein would have forced Americans to give up the post-Cold War "peace dividend."

This explains why the neoconservative ascendancy and the choices made to invade Iraq, remake the Middle East, and pursue an imperial strategy—coming after the bursting of the high-tech bubble and the arrival of the bear on Wall Street—provided Kennedy's thesis with a new momentum.

The expanding U.S. account deficit reflects the rise in defense spending and the growing trade deficit forces the United States to attract about a billion dollars a day so as to prevent dollar collapse and keep interest rates low. And whom should Americans thank for helping finance the overstretched empire? One of the favorite targets for the neoconservative strategy of preventing the rise of other great powers: China.

In an effort to keep its currency stable against the dollar, China's central bank has bought huge amounts of greenbacks over the last few years. Other Asian economies have followed the Chinese example in order to prevent their currencies from appreciating and to weaken their competitive position *vis-à-vis* China. Last year, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Japan added over \$300 billion to their reserves, most of it in U.S. government securities, and helped finance nearly half of the U.S. current-account deficit. In 2004, China had loans outstanding to the U.S. government of more than \$120 billion, in the form of treasury debt that China owned. So China's central bank, together with that of Japan, is buying U.S. treasury bonds, which help sustain America's huge current-account deficit and in turn help finance current American imperial projects—while the U.S. insists on ensuring that China not rise to the position of regional hegemon.

Before 9/11, neoconservatives were toying with the idea of using the threat of an emerging China to mobilize support for an assertive global policy and considered forming a new coalition (Japan, India, and Taiwan) to contain China. In the aftermath of 9/11, administration officials have emphasized the common interests that the United States and China share in combating Islamic terrorism and insurgency, including in China's Xinjiang region where the government is facing a separatist challenge from a large Muslim Uighur minority.

But the Bush approach should not be seen as a new *détente* towards Beijing. The neoconservatives recognize that with America preoccupied in the Middle East and our need for Chinese assistance in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, the United States is not in a position to launch a grand strategy to contain China.

Yet the neocons also assume that American hegemony over the Middle East and its oil would provide Washington with political-economic leverage over China. After all, China's booming economy is becoming increasingly dependent on the oil in the Middle East, controlled by the United States—the same situation Japan faced before World War II. As many of my Chinese friends suspect, the neocons envision a future in which the United States could use its domination of the world's sea lanes to threaten China's oil lifeline unless Beijing bows to Washington's dictates on Taiwan and other issues, in the same way that post-World War II Japan, which receives much of its oil from the Middle East, has no choice but to back U.S. policies in Northeast Asia and the Middle East, recently by sending Japanese peacekeeping troops to Iraq.

But one cannot expect China to finance and provide diplomatic and military support for an overstretched American empire. America is certainly a hegemon

and may be occupying Iraq but, economically at least, it does the opposite of what Lenin expected of imperialist powers, according to British economist Angus Madison. He noted that although America is often called Britain's successor as the world's dominant power, the British had net foreign assets valued at 150 percent of their GDP at the height of the British imperium before World War I. In 2002, the foreign holdings of U.S. stocks, bonds, and other assets exceeded America's foreign assets to the tune of \$2.3 trillion—or 22 percent of GDP. Moreover, as Kennedy suggested in a recent piece in the *Financial Times*, while U.S. defense spending has been increasing over the past few years, it is struggling to keep up with overseas commitments. Hence, rising American current-account deficits and defense spending make it less likely that the United States will be able to sustain economically its hegemony, especially when the dollar's position as the world's reserve currency would be threatened if European and Middle Eastern countries set the price of oil in euros instead of dollars.

Much as the neocons are hoping that the control of Middle Eastern oil resources will provide Washington with economic leverage over the Chinese at a time of crisis over Taiwan, they should recall that in 1956, when Britain and France attacked Egypt, it was the refusal of the Americans to continue to support a collapsing British pound that forced London and France to withdraw from the Suez. A decision by the Chinese to sell their existing stocks of dollar-denominated securities could lead to the collapse of the dollar's value. That would devastate the American economy and the Runaway Empire. ■

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Just War

World War II was a noble cause, and efforts to refight it profit conservatives nothing.

By Andrew J. Bacevich

DISSIDENT CONSERVATIVES are today engaged in a project of considerable urgency: nothing less than an attempt to reconstitute American politics—to replace the sleazy distribution of party favors that passes for politics in Washington with principled argument addressing a raft of pressing economic, social, cultural, and foreign-policy issues.

In this effort to revitalize politics, history will play a central role. How Americans view the past—the achievements we proclaim, the sins we acknowledge, the heroes we celebrate, the miscreants we single out for condemnation—necessarily affects our view of the present and our expectations for the future. Hence, history remains fiercely contested terrain.

Time and again throughout the 20th century, the establishment Left bested the Right in that contest. Whether or not liberals control the media, they have certainly enjoyed the upper hand when it comes to interpreting the past. The authoritative view of U.S. history has been the progressive view—staunchly secular, disdaining traditional values, advocating the expansion of state power to correct social injustice and economic dysfunction, and endorsing so-called “liberal internationalism” as the essential basis of American statecraft. The story of America incorporated into textbooks and permeating the national consciousness has consistently reflected a mainstream liberal sensibility.

Yet in present circumstances the very absence of a conservative imprint on the nation’s collective memory may prove

an advantage. Dissident conservatives today are freed of any responsibility to defend the debased culture to which secularism and the post-’60s celebration of radical autonomy have given birth. They are under no obligation to endorse the ever greater expense and ever increasing intrusiveness of the national-security apparatus, now justified by the ostensible imperatives of homeland security. And they certainly don’t have to speak up on behalf of the buccaneering foreign policies, favored by imperial presidents of both parties, which have yielded not peace and security but the prospect of open-ended war.

Indeed, on this last point—the history of America’s relations with the world beyond its borders—the conservative opportunity for fashioning a critical alternative narrative of the past looms largest. That opportunity presents itself because in a post-9/11 world the received wisdom has become so patently inadequate.

The conventional telling of the tale, familiar to every schoolboy, celebrates the nation’s 20th-century journey to global leadership. To be sure, the journey has not been without its bumps. Throughout that century, despite its purportedly benign intentions, the United States found itself repeatedly and inexplicably ambushed. Gunfights ensued against all manner of desperadoes—Spaniards, Filipinos, Chinese, Mexicans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, Dominicans, Germans, Japanese, Italians, the list goes on and on—each and every conflict thrust upon an innocent nation ostensibly desirous of nothing more than engaging

in peaceful commercial pursuits and seeing others share in the blessings of liberty. Yet as if reflecting some providential verdict, when the smoke finally cleared, the United States had emerged as the world’s dominant power. The end of a century of unprecedented bloodshed found Americans blissfully presiding over a global order in which freedom appeared everywhere on the march.

As commonly depicted, this chronicle comes replete with its own set of stock characters. Credit for America’s rise to the status of sole superpower belongs chiefly to a doughty band of “internationalists” who against all odds succeed in overcoming the opposition of hopelessly provincial and bigoted “isolationists,” and of the wayward American people ever inclined to “turn their back on the world.” If the liberal internationalist account has one overarching lesson to teach, it is this: beware the influence of the unwashed. Successful statecraft requires not attention to the *vox populi* but to the wisdom offered by an enlightened, self-selected elite. When it comes to world affairs, better to trust the Council on Foreign Relations than some rube congressman from Indiana. Better to defer to a Forrestal, Acheson, or Nitze than to listen to your Aunt Betty Lou.

Midway through the first decade of the 21st century, the problems with this artfully fabricated and self-serving yarn are readily apparent. For starters, no sooner had Americans traipsed across Bill Clinton’s bridge to the new century than the U.S. found itself bushwhacked yet again. The events of Sept. 11 plunged the nation

into an amorphous conflict that latter-day versions of Forrestal, Acheson, and Nitze have declared will likely last decades if not generations. Conditioned to accept pronouncements issued by the White House and federal agencies, the American people have dumbly assented to this prospect of open-ended global war. A new generation of best-and-brightest presidential advisers, despite having presumably imbibed all of the operative lessons of Vietnam, proceeded to embark upon an utterly unnecessary preventive war against Iraq, advertised as the central plank of a revised grand strategy. The result: a quagmire that has cost and will continue to cost the United States dearly in myriad ways. Aunt Betty Lou would have been hard-pressed to create a bigger mess.

So, yes, the *faux* conservatives of the Bush administration have offered authentic conservatives a golden opportunity to recast the history of U.S. foreign relations. The plain purpose of this revisionist effort should be to create a usable past, fully accounting for all that a century of liberal internationalism has wrought—endless entanglements and obligations, overstretch, debt, anti-Americanism, the prospect of endless war and perpetual emergencies, and the progressive hollowing out of our domestic economy as mandated by the dictates of free trade and globalization.

Given the historical opportunity immediately at hand, the inclination of some conservatives to seize this moment to revive ancient quarrels related to World War II qualifies as particularly lamentable. Worse than lamentable, it is misguided, counterproductive, and simply wrong.

Right-wing neuralgia about the war of 1939-1945 revolves around two issues. The first deals with the war's origins, questioning whether U.S. intervention was actually in the national interest—in essence taking up the banner once held

aloft by the America First movement. The second issue deals with the war's conclusion, challenging the necessity of acquiescing in Soviet dominion over Eastern Europe as part of the price paid to defeat Nazi Germany—in effect reviving the charge that at Yalta Franklin Roosevelt appeased Stalin and cravenly condemned millions to slavery. In neither case is the charge sustainable.

No doubt Stalin was as odious as Hitler, with as much or more blood on his hands. But it was Hitler's Germany that posed a compelling and immediate threat to America's future well-being. For the United States to permit the Nazis to implement their vision of a Thousand Year Reich in Europe would have been to court suicide. By 1938 at the latest, force alone could thwart Hitler.

To acknowledge that essential truth is not to endorse Roosevelt's deviousness in the months leading up to war. Nor is it to pretend that FDR's alliance with Stalin was anything other than what it was, a bargain with the devil as unsavory as it was expedient. But the bargain was also an essential one. The key statistics are these: together British and American ground troops killed something like 200,000 German soldiers; the Red Army alone killed approximately 3.5 million. Without the Russians, destroying the Nazi regime would have consumed the lives of many, many more Americans.

When the end came, that same Red Army already held Eastern Europe firmly in its grasp. At Yalta, Roosevelt yielded to Stalin only what the Soviet dictator already owned. Although George Patton may have been eager to reverse that verdict, the American people were not. With the assigned mission accomplished, they wanted the troops brought home forthwith. As for the community of democracies subsequently known as "the West," in 1945 it barely existed. Certainly the democracies in the immediate aftermath of a dev-

astating war possessed neither the resources nor the internal cohesion needed to mount a challenge to the newly acquired Soviet empire.

The liberation of Europe entailed the use of means such as strategic bombing that we may in retrospect judge problematic. No war is entirely without its moral ambiguities. Although the anti-interventionist crusade was not without honor, when it came to the merits of the case, America Firsters were dead wrong. And although FDR made his share of mistakes and was guilty at times of being needlessly disingenuous, his strategic instincts remain even in retrospect remarkably sound. The bottom line is this: World War II was and remains today a just and necessary cause.

Make no mistake, conservatives who persist in arguing otherwise will do their cause irreparable harm. To resuscitate hoary attacks against Roosevelt is to invite the same sort of ridicule justly heaped on the heads of left-wing cranks still insisting that Alger Hiss was framed or pleading that members of the Communist Party USA be honored as "liberals in a hurry." And they will be ridiculed for the same reason—those advancing such claims expose themselves as purblind and oblivious to immensely larger truths.

Rather than picking at the accepted truths of World War II, conservatives ought to be in the forefront of those acknowledging and respecting them. After all, the history that cries out for reassessment is not the history of 1939-1945 but the history of 1914-1938 and especially of 1946-2001, during which the habits, routines, and doctrines of liberal internationalists gave rise to the policies that have landed us in our current predicament. ■

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State of the State Secrets

Larry Franklin wanted to sway policy, not just spill intel.

By Justin Raimondo

THE CIRCUMSTANCES surrounding the arrest of Pentagon analyst Lawrence A. Franklin for passing classified information to two employees of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) would make a good thriller. Acted out against a backdrop of war and terrorism, it's a cloak-and-dagger tale swathed in mystery, pregnant with political implications, and hinting at a subtext of hostility beneath the "special relationship" binding the U.S. to Israel. It has all the elements of good fiction—a strong plot, a fascinating set of characters, and a theme that will have the audience buzzing long after they leave the theater. Better yet, it looks like the dramatic climax will come in the form of a courtroom drama in a legal battle pitting the watchdogs of America's vital secrets against a shadowy fifth column.

For years the FBI's counterintelligence unit has been tracking a major espionage cell operating on behalf of Israel. Franklin stumbled into it one summer day in 2003, when he showed up at Tivoli restaurant outside Washington and met with two AIPAC officials—Steve Rosen, AIPAC's longtime foreign-policy director, and Keith Weissman, AIPAC's top Iran specialist. Franklin, described by his colleagues as a naïve ideologue who, as *Ha'aretz* put it, "believes wholeheartedly in the neo-conservative approach," revealed classified information about possible Iranian-sponsored attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq. Franklin was apparently worried that U.S. policymakers were insufficiently alarmed over the alleged Iranian threat

to our interests in Iraq and was looking to enlist AIPAC—and the Israeli government—in pressuring policymakers to take a harder line on Tehran.

What he didn't know, as he spilled U.S. secrets, was that the FBI was recording his every word. It would be a while before he found out. Until then, he was watched, his phone conversations were recorded, and agents observed him trying to pass classified documents to an individual already under surveillance. However, as *Newsweek* described it, the unidentified Israeli spy was "too smart" for that, and insisted Franklin relate the information verbally.

An analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency, Franklin served in the Air Force Reserve and did several tours of duty attached to the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv. As Iran desk officer with the Defense Undersecretary for Policy, Near East South Asia, Franklin later moved to Douglas Feith's Office of Special Plans (OSP), where he and his fellow neocons cooked the intelligence on Iraq according to Ahmad Chalabi's special recipe and then served it up piping hot to Dick Cheney's boys, who delivered it straight to the White House. As Seymour Hersh relates, they called themselves "the Cabal"—a bit of self-mockery that, in retrospect, seems all too descriptive. OSP functioned, in effect, as a parallel intelligence agency. Its mission was to bypass the CIA, the DIA, and the mainline intelligence community and give the War Party the answers they wanted. The cabalists did not limit their activities to writing up talking points, however, but also engaged in field opera-

tions that caught the attention of the State Department and the CIA.

In December 2001, Franklin, along with Harold Rhode, a Middle East expert and Franklin's colleague in Feith's policy shop, and neoconservative writer Michael Ledeen—at the time working for Feith as a consultant—met with the infamous Manucher Ghorbanifar, of Iran-Contra fame, and a group of Iranians, including a former high official of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Also in attendance: Nicolo Pollari, head of the Italian intelligence service, and Italian Defense Minister Antonio Martino. As writer Laura Rozen tells it, "Ghorbanifar told me he has had fifty meetings with Michael Ledeen since September 11th, and that he has given Ledeen '4,000 to 5,000 pages of sensitive documents' concerning Iran, Iraq and the Middle East, 'material no one else has received.'"

In trying to discover how Iran had gotten its hands on vital U.S. secrets, including information on how the U.S. was eavesdropping on the Iranian government's encrypted internal communications, the FBI must surely have taken some interest in these activities. Their chief suspect, after all, was Chalabi, whose Iraqi National Congress supplied much of the grist for the OSP's mill.

A raid on Chalabi's Baghdad headquarters brought the whole affair into the open, and the Chalabi investigation has reared its head again in the Franklin affair. The *Washington Post* reports that the initial stage of the inquiry into Chalabi's activities as a double agent "focused on the activities of a US mili-

tary reservist who was serving at the US Embassy in Israel.”

When the FBI confronted Franklin and searched his home and office—turning up 83 classified documents, spanning three decades—he agreed, at first, to help the investigation, presumably in return for a promise of leniency. By some accounts, notably those by pro-AIPAC writer Edwin Black, Franklin agreed to make a series of monitored phone calls to suspects in the investigation, including neoconservative supporters of Chalabi. They also supposedly planted information via Franklin that Israeli agents operating in the Kurdish area of northern Iraq were in danger of assassination by Iranian agents. The Jewish Telegraphic Agency reports that Franklin met with Weissman on July 21, 2004 outside Nordstrom’s at the Pentagon City mall in Arlington and warned him about Israel’s Kurdish problem. Alarmed, Weissman and Rosen passed this on to AIPAC, which raised the matter in meetings with NSC official Eliot Abrams. They also called Naor Gilon, top political officer at the Israeli embassy. This was followed shortly

high-priced law firm of Plato Cacheris.

The recent kickstarting of the prosecution, however, has seen a sea change in AIPAC’s defense strategy. Rosen and Weissman have been handed their walking papers, and AIPAC is backpedaling furiously on its previous statements denying any wrongdoing by its employees, although the group is still paying the duo’s legal bills. JTA reports indicate they are both to be indicted shortly, and Rosen anticipates the trial may begin as early as January 2006. He has pledged to fight the charges.

When this case comes to trial, it won’t be only three spies for Israel who stand accused: the whole nexus of organizations and interests that came together in the War Party will be put in the dock.

When Franklin walked in unexpectedly on that luncheon meeting, he stumbled onto one of the biggest, most far-reaching espionage investigations since the Cold War. The crime committed in this case involves not only the theft of vital U.S. secrets but a concerted effort to influence American foreign policy on behalf of a foreign power. This is indicated, for one example, by the FBI’s

one at the December 2004 Herzliya Conference, which Franklin attended, and the other in the Pentagon cafeteria.

The Lerman paper argues that the U.S.-Israeli “special relationship” has fallen into “maintenance mode” in recent times and that America’s grand democratization project in the Middle East calls for what Lerman dubs “the Special Relations Initiative of 2005.” Whether this more assertive policy includes such activities as spying is a matter for conjecture, but the FBI’s interest in a top AJC official shows that the scandal is widening.

It is also embracing more than lobbying groups like AIPAC and the AJC. The affidavit supporting Franklin’s arrest noted that Franklin may have disclosed classified information to reporters, and the *New York Times* reports that federal agents have begun questioning journalists who may have written articles based on Franklin’s revelations—the *Times* puts the number so far at four, “among them at least one newspaper journalist and others whose work has been published on the Internet.” The JTA has named the newspaper reporter: Glenn Kessler, the State Department correspondent for the *Washington Post*.

The FBI is said to have taped a July 21, 2004 conversation that Weissman and Rosen had with Kessler. According to the JTA report, they joked about “not getting in trouble” over the exchange of information. “At least we have no Official Secrets Act,” said Rosen, referring to laws on the books in Britain and elsewhere prohibiting receipt of classified information. The joke, however, is on them. If the prosecution proves that they knew they were passing on classified information, including to an official of a foreign nation, they could wind up in the next cell over from Jonathan Pollard.

AIPAC’s defenders lamely claim “mis-handling” classified information is not the same as espionage. Franklin is charged

WHEN THIS CASE COMES TO TRIAL THE **WHOLE NEXUS OF ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERESTS** THAT CAME TOGETHER IN THE **WAR PARTY** WILL BE PUT IN THE DOCK.

afterward by the FBI’s first raid on AIPAC’s Washington headquarters. (They would return four months later.)

Whoever leaked details of the case to CBS News, including Franklin’s identity, nixed the FBI’s efforts to trace the transfer of sensitive materials from the spy nest embedded in our government to Israeli officials. FBI officials were furious: the leaker had effectively sabotaged their investigation, at least for the moment. Franklin stopped co-operating with the authorities, dismissed his court-appointed lawyer, and hired the

recent interrogation of Uzi Arad, formerly director of research for the Mossad and now head of the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Israel’s Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center. According to *The Forward*, the FBI wanted to know why he had sent Franklin a research paper by Eran Lerman on how to re-invigorate America’s relationship with Israel. Lerman, a former IDF intelligence officer, is the executive director of the American Jewish Committee’s office in Israel. They also asked Arad about two conversations he had with Franklin:

with violating Title 18, Section 793(d) of the Espionage Act, which makes it a crime to pass to unauthorized persons “information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.” But Rosen and Weissman, who handed over classified information to Gilon, could face charges under Section 794, which carries a punishment of either death or life imprisonment for the crime of communicating information relating to the national defense “to any foreign government.” According to a report in the *New York Sun*, the charges are so classified that AIPAC lawyer, Nathan Lewis, was required to get a security clearance to hear them.

The mystery at the heart of this investigation is how and when it began. Warren Strobel of Knight Ridder reported in 2004 that the probe “has been going on for more than two years,” and UPI’s Richard Sale cites a “former senior U.S. government official” as saying, “In 2001, the FBI discovered new, ‘massive’ Israeli spying operations in the East Coast, including New York and New Jersey,” and they began watching Gilon, who eventually led them to Franklin. The JTA dates the genesis of the inquiry more precisely: “information garnered during the investigation into alleged leaks from a Pentagon analyst to the two former AIPAC staffers suggests the FBI began probing AIPAC officials just before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.”

Like a dorsal fin poking just above the water, the Franklin spy trial promises us a glimpse of a creature much larger than appears at first sight. Whether the trial will draw it up to the surface remains to be seen. In any case, the magnitude of the problem posed by the covert activities of our ally—heretofore ignored or covered up—is all too clear. ■

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Allies or Ingrates?

The U.S. gets the worst of its relationship with South Korea

By Doug Bandow

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA is one of America’s oldest allies—not that you’d know it listening to ROK President Roh Moo-hyun or talking to many South Koreans. Their irritation at being dependent on America is exceeded only by their unwillingness to take responsibility for their own defense.

For years there was no doubt about the friendship between the two peoples. And protecting the ROK made some sense during the Cold War. But by the 1970s, and certainly by the 1980s, the justification for defending the South was wearing thin. The ROK had dashed ahead of the North economically and won the contest for international support. By 1992, Seoul had even gained recognition by Russia and China.

Still, America’s support was taken for granted. When I first suggested two decades ago that it was time for the ROK to defend itself, the reaction was shock and horror. Today my views are greeted with the same shock and horror. The opposing arguments have changed little.

But the South now wants even more out of the relationship. South Koreans have long expected the U.S. to defend them. But now they also expect Washington to treat them as equals.

For decades, the U.S.-South Korean relationship was predictable. The ROK elite was resolutely pro-American: most spoke English, and many had studied in the United States. Both sides shared an obvious abhorrence of totalitarian communism. Despite occasional hopes for a North-South dialogue, Seoul was usually tougher than the U.S. towards the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Some South Koreans even worried that Washington was preparing to improve relations with the North and dump them as allies.

All that seems so long ago.

In 2002, Roh Moo-hyun was elected president in the midst of surging anti-Americanism. As a political activist, Roh had advocated ousting U.S. troops. After his election, Roh suggested that the ROK “mediate” in any war between America and the North and called for “concessions from both sides.” Indeed, he advocated, “we should proudly say we will not side with North Korea or the United States.” That’s odd talk from the head of a state protected by American blood and treasure.

Although Roh later called the alliance “precious,” the two nations’ differences were set aside, not resolved. Nationalism, cultural conflicts, and policy differences have come together in a very powerful combination. Indeed, popular attitudes towards the U.S. are changing irrevocably. Leadership is passing to younger Koreans who remember Washington’s support for assorted dictatorships, not intervention in the Korean War.

Public attitudes fluctuate, but increasing numbers of ROK citizens view the U.S. unfavorably and, indeed, as a greater threat than North Korea. More are looking favorably at China. Perhaps most important, people’s perceptions of North Korea have changed. More South Korean children identify the DPRK than America as “the friendliest nation

toward South Korea.” The government has dropped any mention of the North as the country’s chief enemy. There have been a string of movies and novels romanticizing the DPRK and demonizing the U.S.

Perceived American arrogance adds fuel to the fire—and not all such sentiments are unreasonable. President Bill Clinton considered taking military action against the North without bothering to consult Seoul. Few South Koreans doubt that President George W. Bush is capable of unilaterally plunging the peninsula into war.

South Korean elites tend to remain more pro-American, but they are no less nationalistic than their fellow citizens. The establishment still wants Washington’s aid, just on the ROK’s terms. When the Bush administration announced plans to withdraw 12,500 soldiers and move other forces south of the demilitarized zone, the whining in Seoul grew deafening. The ROK went into heavy lobbying mode, convincing Washington to stretch out the process.

In short, today South Koreans are not just dependents. They are ungrateful dependents.

WHEN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION ANNOUNCED PLANS TO WITHDRAW 12,500 SOLDIERS, THE WHINING IN SEOUL GREW DEAFENING.

Officials on both sides of the Pacific spout platitudes about how the alliance remains vital and is in great shape. What is necessary, they said at two conferences I recently attended, is to strengthen and expand the relationship. People outside of government tend to be less sanguine about the state of bilateral relations but are no less committed to preserving them. It may make sense for South Korea. But why should America continue to defend the South?

Nothing more irritates ROK policy-

makers than to be told that South Korea is free-riding on the U.S. How can the South be free-riding, one academic asked, since it fields a military? Presumably even one tank is enough. Moreover, my agitated interlocutor complained, Europe was far worse. True, but that’s no defense for the ROK.

Ah, other South Koreans plaintively noted, the North retains a significant military edge. Without the U.S. the ROK would be helpless as thousands of North Korean tanks poured over the border. Surely America wouldn’t want that!

But the military balance is not fixed. The ROK has far surpassed the North in most forms of national power. Listening to many South Koreans, you’d think that military inferiority was an artifact of geography—that the country to the south always has to have fewer tanks, for instance. When I point out that Seoul is capable of spending far more to develop a self-reliant defense, the government’s official goal, the frustration really sets in.

Nearly two decades ago, I was told that South Korea had health and education needs to meet, as if America had no worries in those areas. Almost a decade

ago, the excuse was the Asian economic crisis. Most recently, I was informed that whatever the South’s economic capabilities, South Koreans don’t feel confident that they can defend themselves. Twice the population, 40 times the economic strength, a vast technological edge, and overwhelming international support, but residents of the ROK don’t feel they are up to the task?

Some clever respondents argue that South Korea’s contribution doesn’t matter: it is in America’s interest to keep

its troops in the ROK. Obviously, they add, the U.S. government thinks so.

Obviously. But Washington also believes that it is in America’s interest to protect prosperous and populous states in Europe that face no military threats, to police guerrilla wars in the Balkans that are irrelevant to America’s security, and to entangle the U.S. in a bloody conflict in the Mideast to promote democracy. The fact that the U.S. government is doing something doesn’t provide much evidence that it is in America’s interest.

Moreover, even if defending the ROK in the aftermath of World War II was in America’s interest, that world is gone. Why should the U.S. care much about South Korea’s security now, let alone maintain troops there? To meet unspecified regional contingencies and promote regional stability? Good try, but no cigar. Despite hostility with Japan—South Koreans spend more time denouncing Tokyo than Pyongyang these days—Japan isn’t about to embark upon another aggressive war. Nor can one imagine what interest the U.S. would have in intervening in, say, a disintegrating Indonesia or a Myanmar-Thailand border war or some other local squabble.

Which leaves China. Washington is unlikely to engage in a ground war against Beijing in any case, so the infantry division on station in Korea is of no value. Air bases might prove useful, but does anyone really believe that Seoul would allow America to use its forces stationed in the ROK in a war with China? To become a permanent enemy of the emerging colossus next door, one that possesses a very long memory?

In March, President Roh declared, “I clearly state that the U.S. Forces Korea should not be involved in disputes in Northeast Asia without our consent.” He added, “Our people will not get

entangled in regional disputes against our will in the future.”

Although some South Koreans hope that the U.S. will stick around to guarantee their security from unlikely Chinese aggression, even they are unwilling to invite a Chinese attack by joining the U.S. in a conflict directed at other ends, such as defending Taiwan. However reasonable that might be for South Korea, if America's troops in the South are not needed to defend the ROK and Seoul is unwilling to allow America to use them for any other security purposes, why should the U.S. keep any forces there?

The final argument is stability—that American soldiers act as a magic talisman deterring everyone in the region from engaging in an orgy of aggression. But the presence of a small U.S. garrison in South Korea that is essentially unusable seems unlikely to be a critical factor in maintaining regional peace anywhere. Indeed, America's defense commitment probably works the other way. The fact that both South Korea and Japan feel secure under America's military umbrella makes it easier for them to engage in irresponsible posturing, such as over the unimportant Dokto/Takeshima islands.

Of course, South Korean officials desperately attempt to reassure the U.S. but to no avail. Maybe the hostility of many South Koreans is rooted as much in newfound national confidence as hostility towards America, but the impact on the relationship is the same. Maybe most South Koreans are thinking about economics when they say they prefer Beijing over Washington. But should the U.S. and China come to blows, Seoul still seems unlikely to choose America.

Although some South Korean security analysts promote the idea of strategic flexibility, allowing the U.S. to use its Korea-based forces elsewhere in the region, that position runs contrary to the desires of the current Korean govern-

ment. The lack of certainty destroys the alliance's value for Washington.

The South is entitled to chart its own foreign policy, but it can hardly expect American support for an anti-American course. If South Korea doesn't feel threatened by the North, or doesn't want to do more to defend itself from the DPRK, why should Washington bail it out? And if South Korea wants to be a regional balancer, fine. But the ROK can't expect Americans to risk their blood for South Koreans if the latter won't do the same for Americans.

The U.S.-South Korean alliance ain't what it used to be. The only question is, when will policymakers stop desperately attempting to come up with new justifications for old commitments and instead acknowledge that it is time to retire the alliance? ■

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I Still Like Ike

Eisenhower knew how to run a war—or not.

By Gregory Cochran

WHEN I WAS A KID, I didn't know much about Washington. I didn't need to; back then, you could play on the monkey bars without someone making a federal case out of it. If anyone had asked me about the president, I would probably have said that he was a wise old man who worked very hard at protecting the whole country—with the help of his elves, of course.

All kids want to believe that, but I was lucky. It was true. Dwight Eisenhower was president of the United States.

Eisenhower faced a difficult situation when he took the oath of office. The United States was tied down in an apparently endless war in Korea. We had lost tens of thousands of men and spent many billions while few people could understand why we were even there. Inflation, always fundamentally unsettling, peaked at 9 percent in 1951. The war was undermining confidence in government—Truman hit a record-low

approval rating of 25 percent in the March 1952 Gallup poll—and was fueling Joe McCarthy's meteoric rise. Behind the war in Korea was Stalin's Soviet Union, with the advent of atomic weapons the greatest threat that the United States has ever faced.

First on the agenda was ending the Korean War. It cost too much and was tying up too much of the armed forces in a peripheral struggle—"The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy," as Omar Bradley put it—and had already chewed up one presidency. If Ike's administration were to accomplish anything he had to find an acceptable solution as quickly as possible.

He had a reputation—Supreme Allied Commander, leader of the armies of the West in their victorious fight against Hitler—and he used it. Certainly the Chinese and Russians and North Koreans knew he was the real thing. They may

not have known that Ike was an excellent poker player—good enough to have significantly augmented his meager Army salary during the lean interwar years. Ike used both reputation and gamesman skills in a very effective bluff: he leaked threats of using tactical nuclear weapons in Korea through various channels. And was it really a bluff? Well, Mao, facing the Supreme Commander, had to ask himself, “Do I feel lucky?” That maneuver, combined with a fair amount of good fortune—Stalin died in March and threw the USSR into a succession struggle—made a reasonable peace possible. There are advantages to electing a president who’s a big man, who’s done something with his life other than running for office.

Then what? We had quadrupled the defense budget in response to Korea. Was that enough? Were we strong enough? What about our allies? What should we do about nuclear weapons? Eisenhower actually understood these questions, probably better than any of his generals or advisers.

He understood that nuclear weapons had made war between Great Powers impossible. When the chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers gave a briefing on how the U.S. could re-establish the dollar in the wake of nuclear war, Ike stopped the meeting. He said, “Boys, listen to me. If we have a nuclear exchange, we’re not going to be talking about re-establishing the dollar. We’re going to be talking about grubbing for worms.”

The United States had friends in many places. Ike, as a cautious internationalist, a true conservative, worked at preserving those friendships—but then it’s hard to imagine an administration that would do anything else. Eisenhower was simply unusually effective. After all, who would go out of his way to alienate allies and turn world opinion against the United States?

Eisenhower understood the importance of different sorts of power—military, economic, and political. He knew that a nation could overspend, that when you build more tanks you have fewer tractors. He knew a lot about such trade-offs, having run mobilization studies in the 1930s and played a starring role in the greatest war of production in history—he “knew by heart production man-hours on everything from a bomber to a messkit.” He realized that any reasonable long-run strategy had to balance military strength and economic growth. So he reined in military spending. This was not disarmament since we were the strongest country on earth and continued to be.

He applied the same economy to non-military programs. Although he considered the New Deal irreversible, he opposed significant expansion of entitlement programs. Since the Democrats controlled both House and Senate after the first two years of his term, that often meant exercising the veto: he vetoed 181 bills and managed to run a surplus in three out of his eight years in office. Of course, all presidents use the veto, even when their party controls both houses. Every president is aware of the basic legislative dynamic in which a representative finds it easy to support spending bills that extract a dollar from the country as a whole while doing 50 cents worth of good in his particular district. Well, almost every president.

There was money available for a certain class of effort that is now apparently impossible: building big, useful things. Ike the Builder launched the Interstate System and the St. Lawrence Seaway that connects the Great Lakes to the Atlantic. Back then, people somehow believed that infrastructure improvements were most useful if built in the United States rather than the Middle East.

Although Ike believed in the Atlantic alliance, he declined to participate in truly hare-brained schemes. Simon

Jenkins, columnist for the *Times* of London, in a recent article points out how Eisenhower reacted to a familiar-sounding Mideast crisis. When Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden convinced himself that Nasser was a threat to the entire West—which was, as Eisenhower pointed out, ridiculous. Nasser was a threat only to Egypt. Eden came up with a complex and dishonest scheme in which the Israelis would invade the Sinai, giving France and Great Britain an excuse to “protect” the canal. Eisenhower was against it: against violating the UN Charter with aggressive war, against using war as anything other than a last resort. He said, “Initial military success might be easy, but the eventual price might be far too heavy.” Ike thought that Eden’s constant references to Munich and appeasement were insulting to his intelligence. Only someone without any strategic sense or knowledge of history could possibly think that a poor, weak, backward Arab country was a threat comparable to Nazi Germany.

By ending the Korean War, successfully managing the Soviet threat, and avoiding involvement in pointless peripheral conflicts, Eisenhower allowed Americans to think that the world was reasonably safe. He created “uninteresting times.” But that bucolic “Leave it to Beaver” era didn’t just happen.

I remember a spelling class when I was eight years old. The teacher asked the class to spell a certain word, but the other kids were completely unfamiliar with it. The teacher asked one kid after another, went up one row and ran into me halfway through the second row. I alone knew it. The word was “war.”

Thanks, Ike. ■

Gregory Cochran is a physicist and evolutionary biologist.

Border Skirmishes

The immigration debate pits voters against political elites.

By W. James Antle III

TUCKED AWAY in southern New England, Danbury, Connecticut, is far from the U.S. border with Mexico, but illegal immigration is very much a local problem. Residents complain about overcrowded houses, linguistic balkanization in schools, and wage depression. The mayor has called for state police to receive special immigration-enforcement training to contend with the influx.

By some estimates, the blue-collar city of 77,000 now has an illegal population of around 15,000. Many have moved in over the past decade to take landscaping and construction jobs in affluent neighboring suburbs but not without placing a strain on the community's infrastructure. In April, the new Connecticut Citizens for Immigration Control held a meeting to discuss the issue. "We expected maybe 10 or 15 people would show up," says cofounder Paul Streitz. Instead turnout was closer to 170, along with a few dozen protestors, and the event received national media attention. "We really touched a nerve in Danbury."

Across the country, there has been a palpable hardening of the public's mood on immigration. Yet President Bush and some influential members of Congress from both parties remain impervious to this shift. While cities, states, and concerned citizens' groups grapple with the federal government's manifest failure to control the border, the administration and its allies on Capitol Hill continue to tout thinly veiled amnesty proposals.

The latest example is a bill introduced by Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.)—bearing a restric-

tionist-sounding title, the Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act—that would grant temporary-worker status to illegal aliens already in the country and import at least 400,000 new foreign workers a year. Congressmen Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.), Jim Kolbe (R-Ariz.), and Luis Gutierrez (D-Ill.) introduced a similar version in the House. Bush has so far avoided committing to a specific piece of immigration legislation, but McCain has expressed hope that the president will endorse this one. The bill was drafted with the White House's immigration policy goals in mind.

Like most such measures, it combines liberalization with promises of improved border security and interior enforcement. Illegal aliens would be able to apply for permits to work in the United States for up to six years, subject to a background check and English-proficiency test. Guest workers who can be matched with U.S. employers seeking to fill those ubiquitous jobs Americans won't do are eligible for four-year work permits. The enforcement provisions include an employee-verification system to make it easier to avoid hiring undocumented workers and a process for developing a new national border-security strategy.

Sponsors make much of the fact that the legislation would require illegal aliens to pay a \$1,000 fine to receive a temporary work permit and another \$1,000 when they (and their families) apply for a green card. "This bill is not amnesty," Sen. Kennedy has insisted. "This bill does not provide a free pass to anyone."

But it does indisputably give illegal workers the ability to regularize their status and avoid the consequences of flouting immigration laws. Mark Krikorian of the Center for Immigration Studies recently wrote that the only difference between this bill and past amnesties is that it is a "prospective amnesty" rather than a "retroactive amnesty." Congressman Tom Tancredo (R-Colo.), chairman of the Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus, echoed this sentiment more bluntly: "There is a little more lipstick on this pig than there was before, but it's most certainly the same old pig."

Indeed, the bill doesn't give local law enforcement new tools to combat illegal immigration. It creates a new, untested employee-verification system instead of expanding the Social Security Administration's existing pilot program. Its call for a "National Strategy on Border Security," complete with an advisory committee and working groups, is a case study in how Congress deals with problems it has no interest in solving. And the 400,000 number for guest workers is a floor that can be raised to meet new demands for cheap labor, not a ceiling.

In short, what Kennedy and McCain have offered is almost exactly the opposite of what a majority of Americans wants. Polls have consistently shown that the public favors less immigration, not more, and desires enforcement, not leniency. This is the message that resounds at the grassroots level. "We want just three things," says Streitz. "Protect the borders, enforce the laws, and no amnesties."

But congressional amnesty agitation is just a symptom of a larger problem. When it comes to immigration, there is a sizeable discrepancy between political elites and the citizens they purport to represent. Nowhere is the gulf more pronounced than on the Right, where rank-and-file conservatives overwhelmingly favor immigration enforcement and reduction while Bush Republicans maintain that the existing, broken system is already too restrictive. Even the *Wall Street Journal*, long the Right's bulwark for open borders, has published stories about the issue's potential to split the GOP.

There are many reasons GOP elites are far from their party's base on immigration, but two are of particular importance. The first is the myth that the last national debate over immigration, in the mid-1990s, particularly the bid to pass California's Proposition 187 denying most public services to illegal aliens, did lasting damage to Republican prospects. Efforts to remake the party's image on the issue, touted by consultants as the only way to increase the GOP share of the Hispanic vote, have been underway ever since.

This bit of conventional wisdom never made much sense on its face. Nationally, the GOP's share of the Hispanic vote ranged from a paltry one-fifth to about one-third before Proposition 187 ever made the ballot. California was also already trending Democratic by the time Prop 187 was considered, with liberals Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer taking both of the state's Senate seats in 1992.

In fact, California Gov. Pete Wilson managed to save his 1994 re-election campaign by backing the initiative. He prospered politically where other more timid Republicans who refused to address illegal immigration failed. It is therefore unsurprising that as his own poll numbers fall, Wilson's successor

Arnold Schwarzenegger has picked up the issue. Prop 187 passed easily with 59 percent of the vote and would almost certainly prevail again today.

The argument from Prop 187 is even less tenable after Arizona passed a similar initiative, Proposition 200, during the 2004 elections. Republicans worried that the ballot question would drive up Hispanic turnout and doom their chances in the state. Every GOP member of Arizona's congressional delegation came out against the initiative. Like Prop 187, Prop 200 passed by a wide margin—it polled 47 percent even among Hispanics.

What price did Republicans pay for the immigration-enforcement measure's success? "Kerry lost the state by a wider margin than Al Gore had in 2000," wrote Chuck Todd in the *National Journal*. "And the senator actually had *paid staff* on the ground there for much of the campaign, unlike the vice president in 2000."

Some conservatives also make an economic argument against immigration enforcement. They see the steady flow of illegals as a free-market response to an unskilled labor shortage in this country and contend that any policy that interrupts this flow will drive employers out of business. The real problem with our immigration system, Tamar Jacoby wrote in the *Weekly Standard*, is "a long-standing and all but deliberate mismatch between the size of our yearly quotas and the actual needs of our labor market."

But this argument ignores the role that government plays, both in Mexico and in the U.S., in illegal immigration. Mexico effectively encourages the emigration of its poor and maintains political ties with illegals in this country. (Note President Vicente Fox's comment that Mexicans do the jobs even blacks won't do.) Combined with a policy of non-enforcement by our own government, the result is less market-driven immigration than a virtual subsidy for employers of illegal aliens.

Conservative politicians' immigration leniency has their supporters looking for other options. Streitz predicts that "given the speed of the Internet and modern communications" it is only a matter of time before elected officials are forced to catch up.

There are signs of this even on Capitol Hill. Although McCain and Kennedy have succeeded in putting together a Left-Right coalition where Bush's past amnesty trial balloons have failed, it may not be enough to see their plan enacted. Kennedy has already had one immigration failure this year, his AgJOBS amnesty for agricultural workers. In 2004, AgJOBS had a filibuster-proof 63 cosponsors. Now it is seven votes short of being able to make it to the Senate floor.

Once a graveyard for immigration-reform bills passed by the House of Representatives, the Senate has recently approved legislation making it more difficult for illegal aliens to obtain driver's licenses and appropriating nearly \$300 million in additional border-patrol funds. Even the chairman of the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on immigration, Sen. John Cornyn (R-Texas), is to the right of Kennedy and McCain on guest workers. "I favor a work-and-return bill, not a work-and-stay bill," he told the *Washington Times*.

In the House, the bodies with jurisdiction over most immigration bills are the House Judiciary Committee and its immigration subcommittee. They are chaired by Congressman James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), the driving force behind federal efforts to deny driver's licenses to illegals, and Congressman John Hostettler (R-Ind.), a determined amnesty opponent with high ratings from restrictionist groups respectively.

Powerful forces in both parties are arrayed against immigration control. But activists across the country are exerting pressure on politicians to do the dirty job they were elected to do. ■

Death of the Left?

Liberalism's demise may realign the Right.

By Arthur Versluis

IT WOULD SEEM that from the 1960s to the present, the Left worldwide has been in a consistent decline from power, marked most visibly by the fall of the former Soviet Union. By the beginning of the 21st century in the United States, the once respectable word “liberal” had become a radioactive epithet eschewed by nearly all but the most intrepid and securely ensconced Democrats. Republicans controlled every branch of government, and by many accounts, the Right seemed in the ascendant both in the United States and in the world. The question thus has to arise: have we witnessed the death of the Left?

To answer such a question, one has first to determine what the Left is. This is not so simple as it once may have appeared back during the height of the Cold War when the world could be divided more or less into communist and capitalist. The division of the world between the spheres of the Soviet Union and of the United States (particularly during the 1950s and early 1960s) encouraged a falsely monolithic sense of those on the Left as “fellow travelers” of the huge, bureaucratic communist state. But in fact, much of the Left’s history, especially from the 1960s onward, consisted of efforts to develop an identity distinctively separate from the self-evident failures of state communism.

Indeed, one can see the range of positions on the Left at the meeting of the First International at The Hague in 1872, at which Karl Marx was able to manipulate the organization sufficiently to keep it moving along communist rather than

anarchist lines. Marx’s flamboyant chief opponent was the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, who for all his own errors presciently warned against the emergence of a communist authoritarianism that would take power over working people. Needless to say, while Marx won—in part by moving the headquarters to New York—Bakunin’s critique was ultimately vindicated.

These same broad positions keep recurring throughout the history of the Left and certainly can be seen in the American Left since 1965. On one end of the spectrum, we see those who overtly defend Stalinism or Chinese Communism and the assertion of centralized bureaucratic power. On the other, anarchist end of the spectrum are those who are extremely skeptical of state power in general, and whose aim, somewhat like Bakunin’s, is a more inchoate rage against the machine, an insistence upon revolution for revolution’s sake. The Left spectrum extends, in other words, from enforced collectivism to anarchic individualism.

Different positions in this spectrum have long led to bitter feuds. One of the more entertaining examples of recent internecine warfare on the Left is to be found among anarchists, a reigning anarchy for the last third of the 20th century being Murray Bookchin, a retired Vermont professor and founder of the Institute for Social Ecology. Bookchin, the author of *Post-Scarcity Anarchism* (1971) and numerous other books, describes himself as a “social anarchist” because he looks forward to a (gentle)

societal revolution. Since 1995, Bookchin has lit out after those whom he terms “lifestyle anarchists.” They in turn responded with books like David Watson’s *Beyond Bookchin* or Bob Black’s fiercely polemical *Anarchy After Leftism*, arguing that Bookchin’s neo-Marxist, collectivist anarchism is likely to lead to state-centralized authoritarianism and in any case has a musty odor about it. Contemporary anarchism is certainly vigorous, and in all of its tumult, one occasionally hears at least the distant echoes of Marx and Bakunin.

But critique of the military-industrial state in the name of participatory democracy long has been implicit in the American Left, especially since the 1962 Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The very name emphasizes democracy, and so too did the Port Huron Statement. The SDS, and to some extent the New Left more generally, was infused with a hostility toward centralized military-industrial power, behind which was a significant body of political and social science literature, including such works as C. Wright Mills’s *Power Elite*, Paul Goodman’s *Growing Up Absurd*, and perhaps most of all, Herbert Marcuse’s *One-Dimensional Man*. During this period, the Left began to be associated primarily with criticism of the American military-industrial state.

When we look in American history for prior opponents of the centralized bureaucratic state, we can find them, among other places, in what is now often termed the Old Right, which

included John T. Flynn, Albert Jay Nock, and Herbert Agar. A number of Old Right authors, from the 1930s onward, were extremely skeptical of American military adventurism abroad, of big business, and of centralized state power in general. Many were opposed to Roosevelt's bureaucratization of the American state—which Flynn likened to fascism—and to centralized corporate power. Their principles, carried forward into the 1960s, logically would have allied them with the students who opposed the Vietnam War as well as an

ings, just as the intellectual Right became more identified with a centralized American state, the Left became more and more identifiable as those who stood against the military-industrial state. Yet the Left did so without an over-arching secular millennialist plan for the future. Several graduate students recently interviewed Bill Ayers, a founding member of the Weather Underground, and pressed him about the kind of state he and his fellow members imagined would follow upon their imagined American revolution. His answers were diffuse

part toward theories highly critical of any “metanarrative.” Thus emerged what became known as postmodern theory.

Postmodern theorism came into prominence in the 1980s and by the 1990s was at full ascendancy in the American academy. Many of its primary figures could be termed “late Marxist,” if not “post-Marxist,” in orientation, since residual Marxist terminology and ideology informed their writing, and yet implicit in it also was the absence of any belief in broad social transformation, let alone revolution. A pivotal work of this era was Gilles Deleuze's and Félix Guattari's baroque contraption *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987), which extols nomadism and the assemblage of a nomadic “war machine.” It bears an interesting relationship to—and in some respects reflects on a theoretical level—the peregrine militancy of underground groups like Weatherman or the Red Army Faction. But the key is that the work is theoretical: it represents as well as anything the retreat of the Left into the abstruse sphere of intellectual puzzles.

The word to describe the Left in the last few decades is fragmentation. Postmodern theorism is, by and large, intellectual analysis refined to a rarified degree in order to create an esoteric terminology and a safe sphere of critique largely separated from the gritty world outside academia. But this is only one example among many of the Left's dissolution into a variety of self-contained groups. Indeed, inherent in the very nature of identity politics is fragmentation or separatism. So long as a group is devoted primarily to advancing its own particular agenda, it will be less interested in a larger, overarching coalition that could unite it with some larger group, like workers. The emergence of identity politics in America occurred along with the decline of unions and with the export of Ameri-

SO LONG AS A GROUP IS DEVOTED PRIMARILY TO **ADVANCING ITS OWN PARTICULAR AGENDA**, IT WILL BE LESS INTERESTED IN A **LARGER, OVERARCHING COALITION**.

American military-industrial corporate state more generally, and indeed, Flynn warned against American military involvement in Southeast Asia, pre-Scientist as early as 1954.

But a New Right was emerging. In striking contrast to Flynn, in January 1952, William F. Buckley wrote in *Commonweal*, “we have to accept Big Government for the duration—for neither an offensive nor defensive war can be waged given our present government skills, except through the instrument of a totalitarian bureaucracy within our shores And if they deem Soviet power a menace to our freedom (as I happen to), they will have to support large armies and air forces, atomic energy, central intelligence, war production boards, and the attendant of centralization of power in Washington...” The military-industrial globalist adventurism of early 21st-century neoconservatism can be seen already in young Buckley's endorsement of “a totalitarian bureaucracy within our shores.”

From the 1960s onward, especially with the emergence of the Weatherman Underground and its campaign of bomb-

and indicated what is visible in the Weatherman communiqués as well—they weren't quite sure what a future state would look like, except it would not be American corporate-militarism. This is very much akin to the writings of Noam Chomsky or even Ward Churchill today: they are highly critical of the existing American government, but they do not offer a secular millennialist vision for the future. Why? Not least, I think, because the communist states turned out to be totalitarian.

The Left's role as critic of the military-industrial American state, yet without a clear vision for an alternative future, came about to a large degree because already by the 1960s and certainly in the 1970s and 1980s, it was becoming clear even to the true believers that communist states were failed attempts at utopias. The horrors of Stalin's reign, the nightmarish Chinese Cultural Revolution, the Russian gulags, the butchery of Pol Pot's regime—the imagined secular millennium in each case turned out to be monstrous when put into practice. And so the Left had no workable model to offer—indeed, the Left turned in large

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can manufacturing jobs, which made larger common agendas for the Left even more difficult.

Despite all this, it would be a serious mistake for conservatives to assume triumphantly that the Left is dead or even on life support. Among the most influential books now in Left academic circles are those of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, notably *Empire* (2000) and *Multitude* (2004). These two books, and especially the latter, represent efforts to steer the Left past the bloated corpses of totalitarian communist states and toward some vaguely imagined new secular aeon. The precise outline of their plan is not all that clear, but it does have some familiar aspects, among them the recurrent theme of participatory democracy. In fact, near the end of *Multitude*, Hardt and Negri actually propose that one possible guide for their future ideal state is none other than James Madison. Yes, that James Madison.

Of course, it's not as though these archetypal figures of the Left really belong to the Right. In the place of Marx's term "proletariat," Hardt and Negri use the word "multitude," which, they believe, better allows for the preservation of identity politics within collectivism. And although they occasionally tie their text to verses from the New Testament, there is a perverse quality to such allusions, as when they cite as precedent for the word "multitude" the story of the Gadarene demoniac whom Jesus encountered, and who in the Gospel of Mark says to Jesus, "My name is Legion: for we are many." Talk about being the devil's advocate! Dostoevsky would recognize these types right away.

But most troubling is that Hardt and Negri represent the return of secular millennialism. Like Marx, Lenin, and Mao, they imagine some great and sudden social transformation that involves, they think, a "machinic multi-

tude." It really isn't clear what vision they have for some future utopian state, any more than it was clear for their predecessors, but their millennialist language troubles even some on the Left. Still, while relatively popular for somewhat theoretical neo-Marxist writings, the books of Hardt and Negri are far from household commonplaces, and at present one can see relatively little indication that the Left, as they envision it, is in the ascendant.

And yet we have to ask ourselves: when the consequences of globalization—the export of American manufacturing and agriculture—really hit home, when the results of a massive American trade imbalance with Communist China are completely visible, when the recession or depression finally hits with full force, do we really think that the pendulum might not swing back in the other direction? Might it not be possible that many of today's policies here and abroad are sowing the seeds for a return of the murderous nightmares of more secular millennialism?

Historians—like our greatest contemporary historian, John Lukacs, in his masterful history of America in the past century, *A New Republic*—will no doubt remark that it is unclear how military adventurism and interventionism around the globe, policies "rendering" prisoners to the secular arm of foreign countries for torture, gulags where people are held indefinitely without trial, a gigantic military-industrial managerial bureaucracy, the curtailing of civil liberties, unsustainable deficit spending, obsequious behavior toward our greatest military threat, Communist China, and ever intensifying centralization of power in the federal government can be considered conservative in any meaningful sense of the word.

Indeed, if a careful study of the history of the Left during the 20th century leads to any clear conclusion, surely it

leads to this one: that the massive centralization of a managerial bureaucracy, especially in the name of a secular millennialist vision, has led all too quickly to ideological purges and to all the other horrors of totalitarianism. Seen in this light, the hesitation of at least some on the American Left to embrace grand utopian schemes is not something to be scorned but rather may be a sign of welcome skepticism about the busybody notion that one can impose utopia upon others by force. Yet has the Right or the Left truly learned this lesson?

I must confess, I have come to wonder whether, in the end, terms like Left and Right are not quite as useful as is a political spectrum that goes from the totalized state at one end, to decentralized anarchism or libertarianism on the other, with all manner of gradations in between. Perhaps it is salutary for us each to consider where we belong on such a spectrum. It is possible, after all, that some on the so-called Left—who have come to be skeptical of grand state metanarratives and managerial bureaucracies, and who encourage decentralization, small businesses, and small farms—are closer to what used to be called conservatism than many on the so-called Right.

Clearly, investigating a theme like the death of the Left rapidly leads to fundamental questions about the very nature of political categories themselves. Such questioning is essential, from time to time, and if it disturbs some, perhaps they should take the opportunity to stop and consider exactly what they stand for and why. For inevitably, consideration of what has happened to the Left forces one to confront what it means to belong to the Right in the first place. ■

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Summer Reeding

I WALKED ALONG Lopez Cotilla through the used-book district. I was leaving for 10 days in Ecuador and wanted something to read on the trip. In the small English section of one stall, I found a serviceable trove: Kipling's *Plain Tales From the Hills* and *Soldiers Three*, the *Norton Anthology of English Literature*, Ernest van den Haag's *Jewish Mystique*, and Shirer's *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. These set me back \$22.

Any reader of my age and reasonable intelligence might have bought the same books. None of them is demanding. I had read Kipling before high school and *Berlin Diary* in high school. Yes, Shirer requires a sophisticated vocabulary, a first-name familiarity with sentences of more than one clause, and an attention span measured in units greater than milliseconds. In aggregate, these were once known as "being able to read."

Anyone familiar with today's young must be painfully aware that few can, or would, read these books. For one thing, they are too impatient, perhaps having been shaped by the flick-flick of television to the point that lengthy concentration is beyond them. For another, they lack the indefinable but crucial background that comes of having read hundreds of books.

And they don't know English—what an indirect object is or the subjunctive or why. They do not know that a word that looks vaguely like another may mean something different or that the finer shades of meaning have their uses.

Worse, they have been taught that careful literacy is not democratic and that the value of a book springs from the ethnicity of the author. I am aware of no other civilization that has regarded benightedness with irredentist longing.

If I were to make a list of books I would recommend to adults and children alike, I would begin with *Winnie*

the Pooh and *The House at Pooh Corner*, not because I am in arrested development, though I may be. It would be because the English is masterly, the limning of a magical world adroit, and Shepherd's drawings exquisite. But to enjoy them you need to appreciate the language (and not be too full of yourself).

I would follow Pooh with *The Wind in the Willows*, *Alice in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking Glass*, *Stalky and Company* and both *Jungle Books*, *Tom Sawyer* and *Huckleberry Finn*, and *The Lord of the Rings*. At this point we reach the realm of purely adult books, of which there are thousands of excellent examples, almost none of them written recently. The young who have read the books suggested in the foregoing, and gorged indiscriminately on whatever the library offers, will be ready for other fare. Instead they watch the Disney versions—grinning, shallow, degraded.

Once short stories were everywhere—sparkling, varied, idiosyncratic, and sometimes eccentric, crafted by writers who knew what they were doing. And they were read by readers who knew what they were doing. Gone.

Poetry? Once it was vastly enjoyed by cultivated people who knew how to read it. Of course, it was produced by people who knew how to write it. Today there is almost nothing, and what there is, shouldn't be. How is it that a nation of 300 million people, with far more avenues to learning than existed in 1600, cannot belch up a single Edmund Spenser? The entire nation is literarily inferior to 30 men in the reeking nightmare that was Elizabeth's London.

America was not always so. I just ordered a collection of Dorothy Parker's poetry and short stories, chiefly for the verse. Critics say that she hasn't worn well. I suspect that the critics are idiots.

This is always a good bet. She can make the language jump through hoops, say exactly what she wants to say crisply and originally. ("What fresh hell is this?")

Even trivial literature used to be pretty good. In high school I discovered Thorne Smith's *Night Life of the Gods*. When it was written in 1931, readers were expected to recognize the play on *Twilight of the Gods*; it is the sort of thing that one picked up through wide and voracious reading.

Great literature *Nightlife* isn't. It is, however, light, amusing, imaginative, unpretentious, and written by a writer—an uncommon circumstance these days. He never lapses into the clanking solecisms that many professors today never lapse out of. He uses the language instead of walking over it. It is froth, but good froth. This we almost no longer have.

Is there something about modern life that makes impossible both writing and reading beyond the level one associates with drug dealers? The British once wrote graceful prose, but they are barely better than Americans now. Is it that both countries have shifted from aristocratic to proletarian ideals? That no esthetic enterprise can survive the imposition of vulgarity by television?

The best have become afraid of the worst, have lost all confidence in themselves. A couple of times in Smith's novels, a character misuses a word, whereupon another corrects him. I recall that such minor policing was common in the Fifties. The civilized seemed to regard English as public property that the well-bred should treat with respect.

Can you imagine today saying to someone, "Lying down, not laying down"? The consequence would be an explosion of anger in which all about would agree that such elitism was reprehensible. Onward, upward, and back into the trees. ■

Arts & Letters

BOOKS

[*The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*, Thomas L. Friedman, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 469 pages]

Flattening Will Get You Nowhere

By James P. Pinkerton

NOBODY HERE BUT us flat people, living here in this flat world. That's the message Thomas L. Friedman wants to convey after we finish reading *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*.

It's not true, of course: the world is plenty vertical—hierarchical, bumpily uneven in the distribution of resources, power, and controlling secrets—and it's becoming more so. But Friedman has history on his side, or at least his sense of an inevitable history, derived from a perhaps surprising, albeit well-known, voice from the 19th century.

In Friedman's telling, you and me, plus blue-collar workers, Third World farmers, *New York Times* columnists, and Bill Gates, are all living in a flattened planet on which the forces of globalization are buffeting and transforming us. And, oh yes: each of us, regardless of wealth or power differentials, should do our part to accelerate the progressive rush of the future.

In his 469 pages, the three-time Pulitzer Prize winner scopes out the planet's new contours, offering this con-

sidered judgment: "Both classic economic theory and the inherent strengths of the American economy have convinced me that American individuals have nothing to worry about from a flat world—provided we roll up our sleeves." Note the jaunty "we," as in, we're all in this together, folks, here in Flatworld.

Yet for all his propagandizing for flatitude, Friedman seems to spend his time in the far pavilions, atop the commanding heights. The inspiration for the book, he tells us in the first few pages—beginning a long skein of name-dropping—came from Nandan Nilekani, CEO of Infosys Technologies Limited in Bangalore. And the rest of the book features a cavalcade of corporate leaders, from Reuters to Wal-Mart to UPS to Intel to Rolls-Royce to JetBlue to Dell to eBay. In between CEO-fluffing, Friedman shares the names of favorite airlines, cool family friends, and TV networks that have paid him money.

Not surprisingly, such chumminess with chieftains has softened, not to say dulled, his critical faculties. Wal-Mart, for example, gets slapped around more in the pages of *Fortune* than in Friedman's book. Similarly, Boeing's decision to outsource aeronautical jobs to Russia is treated as unalloyed good news because, he is assured, there's a "shortage" of such engineers in the U.S. Then the unnamed honcho of a major European multinational reveals "we are a global research company now"—which revelation the *Times*man treats as a scoop—and former Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo takes Friedman aside and shares this pearl: Mexico and Latin America have "fantastic potential."

Of course, high-level hobnobbing yields up some good stuff, too. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell recalls

that when he wanted to examine old treaty texts, he simply Googled them; in other words, technology enabled him to bypass the Foggy Bottom bureaucracy. And Microsoft's Bill Gates shares a mini-insight: "When you meet Chinese politicians, they are all scientists and engineers. You can have a numeric discussion with them—you are never discussing 'give me a one-liner to embarrass [my political rivals] with.'"

Friedman has done his homework on such just-in-timely topics as how computers are made, how supply chains operate, and how browsers function. This behind-the-scenesing and inside-the-machinesing will be familiar to readers of business magazines and perhaps an issue or two of *Wired*, but Friedman wields a deft pen as he provides both anecdotes and historical context. In the '50s, he recalls, the Interstate Highway System flattened America, making it "so much easier for companies to relocate in lower-wage regions, like the South." Today infrastructural improvements are flattening the world as a whole, such that "3 billion people who had been frozen out of the field suddenly found themselves liberated to plug and play with everybody else."

One might suppose that Joseph "creative destruction" Schumpeter has been an influence on Friedman, but in fact the Austrian economist is nowhere to be found in this book. Instead, Friedman provocatively—and revealingly—gives maximum intellectual credit to an earlier German-speaker: Karl Marx.

It first occurs to the reader that Friedman is playing name-games with communist lore in chapter two, titled "The Ten Forces That Flattened the World." That label seems like an inside-joke play on John Reed's eyewitness account of the Bolshevik revolution, *Ten Days That Shook The World*. But

then in the next chapter Friedman brings in Marx big time. According to the author, “reading *The Communist Manifesto* today, I am in awe at how incisively Marx detailed the forces that were flattening the world during the rise of the Industrial Revolution, and how much he foreshadowed the way these same forces would keep flattening the world right up to the present.” Which is to say, the phenomenon of world-flattening is nothing new; it’s been going on, albeit accelerating, for more than two centuries.

Such an admission might seem to undercut the cutting-edginess of Friedman’s book, but the author doesn’t seem to care; he’s too busy reveling in Marx’s purple prose, which stretches, unedited, over more than a full page. Indeed, Marx made Friedman’s argument long before Friedman: “All fixed, fast, frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away,” Marx wrote a century-and-a-half ago, “all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned.” Meanwhile, even as capitalism is pulverizing tradition, the bourgeoisie, per Marx as quoted by Friedman, is chasing after markets “over the whole surface of the globe.” The bottom line is that “all old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed.”

Friedman is no communist, not at all. If anything, he is the opposite; as in his similar book from 2000, *The Lexus and The Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization*, he is something of a cheerleader for billionaires and their value system. But for all their vast differences in economic ideology, the two writers from two different eras share a similarity as they prophesy the deterministic destiny of the world. And that’s the debt, only partially acknowledged, that Friedman owes to Marx. Like his predecessor, Friedman works from a materialistic worldview, a vision of history in which events unfold in certain ways—ways that are inevitable as well as desirable. It’s a secular utopianism, promising a near-heaven here on earth.

And the path to such a possible semi-paradise, Friedman maintains, is closer economic and social integration across the planet. He notes that the familiar social contract “has been ripped up with the flattening of the world,” but he scorns most attempts to reweave that contract—“don’t try to build walls,” he commands, referring to trade barriers. So what to do instead? Friedman endorses a Clintonish litany of programs to build “human capital,” aimed at bolstering the middle class—although he never pauses to consider that maybe, in a flattened world of near-perfect competition for the cheapest possible labor, there’s virtually no limit to the downward pressure on wages. That’s a basic point that Friedman fails to acknowledge; to do so would cause ordinary Americans to question his econo-utopianism.

Meanwhile, Friedman is determined to block wall-building, expressing the same fervor as the British economist Richard Cobden, who declared in 1857, “Free trade is God’s diplomacy. There is no other certain way of uniting people in the bonds of peace.” Indeed, the Cobden quote graces one of the volume’s chapter headings.

No wonder Friedman is disdainful of the emerging anti-globalization coalition, dubbed the “Wall Party,” which will

investment bankers on Wall Street or service workers linked to the global economy in Palo Alto, who have been enriched by the flattening of the world.

He’ll take Goldman Sachs and Hewlett-Packard any day.

And while Friedman evinces a certain amount of sympathy for Third World left-behinds, as any reader of his *Times* column knows, he has no patience for the platform of the Religious Right. Continuing on the same *kulturkampf*-y theme, he adds:

“The Passion of the Christ’ audience will be in the same trench with the Teamsters and the AFL-CIO, while the Hollywood and Wall Street liberals and the “You’ve Got Mail” crowd will be in the same trench with the high-tech workers of Silicon Valley and the global service providers of Manhattan and San Francisco. It will be Mel Gibson and Jimmy Hoffa Jr. versus Bill Gates and Meg Ryan.

But of course, there’s something deeply flawed about the Friedman vision of free trade. In a word, it’s not free. Let’s consider the three elements of true free trade—mobile capital, mobile

FRIEDMAN IS DISDAINFUL OF THE EMERGING ANTI-GLOBALIZATION COALITION.

shuffle existing partisan and cultural alliances as it opposes what might be called the Flat Party. There is no doubt whose side he’s on as he arrays old value systems, represented by blue-collar workers and traditional religion, against new value systems, represented by the world-flattening forces of capital and technology:

Let’s face it: Republican cultural conservatives have much more in common with the steelworkers of Youngstown, Ohio, the farmers of rural China, and the mullahs of central Saudi Arabia, who would also like more walls, than they do with

goods and services, and, just as importantly, mobile labor. Do all three elements obtain today? Will they ever? Of course not.

It is true, thanks mostly to the barrier-busting World Trade Organization, that investment capital today is pretty much mobile anywhere in the world. And as for goods and services, the WTO has lowered many of the barriers; Toyota and Aetna aren’t totally free to go wherever they want, but they’re substantially free. Yet the third category, labor, is relatively immobile. Yes, there’s more migration than ever, but human beings are sticky and illiquid compared to money and manufactures. That is, workers and

their families, rooted in one place, will always be stolidly vulnerable to factory closings—and their paychecks vulnerable to the mere threat of such closings.

So while the world might look flat from the Fortune 500's windows or from Friedman's laptop, those near globalization's millions of ground zeros find the environment looking rather steep. Moreover, one might ask, does the ever-growing American government look as if it's getting flatter—or is it fatter? In Washington, the government veils itself ever further inside the folds of "national security," as federal buildings look increasingly like kremlins. Nationwide, the Patriot Act, Total Information Awareness, and other bureaucratic proofs that war is the health of the state continue to multiply, if not metastasize.

Friedman has little to say about this sort of de-flattening. Nor does he talk much about foreign policy, which has been his stock-in-trade for a quarter-century now. In his terse treatment of a flattened world's foreign policy, he devotes considerable attention only to transforming the Middle East, which is the area of the world, he tells us, that is most in need of American ministrations.

Yet interestingly, one would never know from this book that Friedman was a strong proponent of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Yes, he has bashed George W. Bush as often as he could over the past five years, but in the moments when it mattered most, he maintained his support for Bush's war policy. On September 13, 2003, for example, he told Tim Russert on CNBC that there had been three "great bubbles" in the past decade—Nasdaq, Enron, and Arab terrorism. And so, he continued, "We need to go into the heart of their world and beat their brains out, in order to burst this bubble."

But now, two quagmiring years later, the bubble that has burst is optimism about American policy in the Middle East. No wonder Friedman's book does not mention his support for the Iraq War; his entire policy prescription for Iraq is merely a single phrase in a long sentence, urging America to work toward

"stabilizing Iraq." Well, who destabilized it?

Yet the author has faith in himself and his judgment—and it's his book, after all. So he tells us that he was visiting Cairo when a young man came up to him and said, "Keep writing what you're writing." Thus Friedman joins all the other point-makers who have miraculously found cab drivers who agree with them—and state their agreement in perfect sentences.

The author will no doubt write more about the Middle East in his next book, in which he will perhaps explain why the Arabs so stubbornly resist the inevitable logic of world-flattening. But as for the rest of the globe, he has a two-part dream.

The first part, as we have seen, is a kind of inverted Marxist utopianism, in which capitalism has replaced communism as the wave of the future.

The second part of the dream is transferred Lennonist lyricism—as in John Lennon, the late Beatles musician. In the concluding chapter of the book, simply titled "Imagination"—adapting the name of Lennon's best-known song—Friedman quotes an IBM scientist-sage: "We need to think more seriously than ever about how we encourage people to focus on productive outcomes that advance and unite civilization." Continuing, the IBMer declares, to Friedman's obvious approval, that peaceful imaginations are needed to "minimize alienation and celebrate interdependence rather than self-sufficiency." Wow. In other words, Marx, who always worried about capitalism-caused alienation, has gained new disciples to carry out his utopian destinarism.

That's a world that's not flat, nor even vertical. Instead, it's totally dream-weaving Friedmanism, with a little help from his friends. ■

James P. Pinkerton is a columnist for Newsday and a fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C. He served in the White House under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.

[*Bertrand de Jouvenel: The Conservative Liberal and the Illusions of Modernity*, Daniel J. Mahoney, ISI Books, 202 pages]

On Power and Politics

By George W. Carey

AT THE OUTSET my Georgetown course Contemporary American Conservative Thought, I take care to inform my students that of the dozen or so books they will be required to read, three—strictly speaking—fall outside its parameters. One, neither American nor contemporary, is Burke's *Reflections*; the other two, *On Power* and *The Ethics of Redistribution*, though they can be thought of as contemporary, are products of the French political theorist Bertrand de Jouvenel (1903-87). I assign these works by Jouvenel simply because I can find no American equivalents. Like *Reflections*, both his works—but especially *On Power*—uniquely structure and highlight concerns that take us to the foundations of conservative thought.

I can only agree, therefore, with what Dan Mahoney observes at the beginning of his splendid volume: Jouvenel is one of the few truly great political theorists of the 20th century. Yet outside the small circle of conservative political theorists in the groves of academe, Jouvenel's works are scarcely accorded the attention they are due. In France, two of his three major books are out of print and, as Mahoney remarks, save for the efforts of Liberty Press and Transaction Publishers, his works would not readily be accessible to Americans. Mahoney has set himself the task of rectifying this neglect.

In seven chapters, Mahoney covers Jouvenel's major works and contributions, throughout providing commentary and analysis, some of it adversely critical. He also incorporates biographical information that provides a much

needed insight into Jouvenel's understanding of politics. For the most part, though, Mahoney concentrates on the books for which Jouvenel is best known: *On Power: The Natural History of Its Growth*; *Sovereignty: An Inquiry Into the Political Good*; *The Pure Theory of Politics*; and *The Ethics of Redistribution*.

Trying to synthesize Jouvenel's contributions is difficult because of the range and depth of his concerns. After an introductory overview, Mahoney begins with the picture Jouvenel draws of the modern centralized state in the first chapter of *On Power*, "The Minotaur Presented," because from this account emerge the central concerns of his later works. It is here that Jouvenel introduces the startling notion, later amplified, that the modern democratic state is potentially the most dangerous regime that has ever existed. He dramatically points out that democracies now possess powers that the most despotic kings of the 17th century could only dream about. Whereas kings frequently had to go begging for money and men to support their ventures, democratic regimes possess virtually unlimited powers of taxation as well as the capacity to raise enormous armies through conscription.

Jouvenel takes pains to emphasize the barbarism that flows from this expansion of power. At one point, after noting that the number killed or wounded in World War I was five times greater than all the men under arms at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, he laments, "We are ending where the savages began. We have found again the lost arts of starving non-combatants, burning hovels, and leading away the vanquished into slavery."

How did democracy contribute to this expansion of state power? The answer relates to the fact that in democracies, unlike monarchical or aristocratic regimes, there is no "he" or "they" commanding "us." As a result, in democracies the skepticism, suspicion, and even resistance that often accompany the exercise of power by the one or few

over the many are absent. What is more, since the "general will" rules and all presumably share in government, unlimited force can now be safely lodged with the state.

Jouvenel's main concern centers on limiting the power that resides in democratic states. On this score, he notes enormous difficulties, the most important of which have resulted from the breakdown of the "community of belief"—the higher laws, religious sanctions, traditions, folkways, and customs—that served to restrain power in times past. Western societies, he observes, have all suffered from the "crisis of rationality" in which these restraints have been subjected to the scrutiny of a highly circumscribed critical reason and found wanting. The result is a pervasive relativism that undermines efforts to curb power through a consensus on ethical, traditional, or religious norms. Jouvenel looks to "makeweights," intermediate institutions and associations that might check the powers of the state. But effective makeweights, he insists, must represent social power; they cannot be the product of rational designs, even those constructed with the best of intentions. Like Robert Nisbet and other disciples of Tocqueville, Jouvenel perceives power as undermining such institutions as the family, church, and local governments, leaving the individual alone and defenseless before an almighty centralized state.

While Mahoney faults Jouvenel for certain ambiguities surrounding his treatment of tyranny, there can be no question that he viewed the beneficent welfare state as a threat to liberty. So much is clear from the final chapters of *On Power*. Jouvenel frames the issue in terms of liberty or security—with security possessing the upper hand, resulting eventually in a "social protectorate." Already, he remarks, the view has taken hold that the resources of the state should be employed to "increase the sum of human happiness." Moreover, insofar as science has "reduced the human being to one animal among

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many," why should it not be, he asks, "Power's business to impel man along the path of his perfection?" Looking ahead he could anticipate the state tending to such matters as the proper family diet and care of the body. Ultimately, he feared the emergence of those tempted "to build Cities of the Sun" that would embody their visions of perfect societies free from evils and disorders.

Mahoney regards an abiding concern with liberty as the major common theme in Jouvenel's political trilogy. Whereas in *On Power* he offers a gloomy prognosis for the future, in *Sovereignty*, as Mahoney relates, Jouvenel had come to accept the realities of the modern state and employed his analytical abilities to confront the complex questions surrounding how authority could be employed to preserve liberty and simultaneously realize the common good. He recognized that in the "open society" there is incessant change and a wide diversity of interest with an attendant

loss of social solidarity, leading many individuals to yearn for the homogeneity, harmony, and close bonds of the small community. Insisting that a return to such idyllic communities was simply out of the question, the "conundrum" faced by Jouvenel, as Mahoney structures it, was how to balance the liberty, innovation, and change of the large modern nation state with the virtues of the small, closely knit, harmonious community. It may be that Jouvenel never satisfactorily resolved this tension. Nevertheless, his analysis and insights are themselves a sufficient reward for the serious thinker.

Jouvenel, for all of his concern about state power, was far from being a libertarian. Liberty and the realization of individual potential, he insists, depend on the strength and vibrancy of varied associations, particularly the family which protects, nourishes, and orients the individual to the ways of the wider community. Moreover, he rejected the theoretical foundations upon which individual rights and libertarianism rest. In his *Pure Theory of Politics*, wherein he seeks a purely descriptive, non-normative model for understanding politics, he goes to some lengths in emphasizing the inadequacies of the social-contract approach for this purpose. Because his focus in this undertaking centers on the capacities of "man to move man," he concedes that he must "deal with simple relationships between individuals." He is quick to add, however, that individuals "are not independent atoms"; on the contrary, they are "deeply rooted in social soil." On Mahoney's showing, Jouvenel shared Burke's understanding of society as a contract in the sense of a partnership, especially that between the living, the dead, and those who are to be born.

Jouvenel's *Ethics of Redistribution* is a unique work because it focuses not on the economic aspects but on the disastrous cultural consequences that would ensue from equalizing income through redistribution. For instance, he points out, society would have to forgo "first-quality goods" and eventually the skills

necessary to produce them, there being no one with the wherewithal to purchase these goods. While the "creative intellectual and artistic activities" would be among the first to suffer, the long-term effects on society as a whole would be devastating—charity and voluntarism would disappear; hospitality would diminish; hobbies would have to be abandoned; incentives would vanish. Jouvenel maintains that as the state attempts to compensate for what is lost through redistribution, its power grows to truly dangerous proportions. Ultimately, it even becomes the arbiter of what cultural activities will be supported.

This is not to say that Jouvenel equated the good life with material satisfaction. In his writings on economics and the modern state, as Mahoney shows, he is concerned with ways to "humanize and civilize the productivist city." Readers of his *Ethics of Redistribution*, for example, cannot help but note his harsh criticism of certain policies in today's commercial states. Redistribution, he believes, has led individuals to seek shelter in the womb of corporations that are accorded special tax treatment by the state. Perhaps reflecting Catholic social theory, which is never too far beneath the surface of his analyses, Jouvenel laments this development as prejudicial to the individual and family. "It is quite incomprehensible," he writes in this connection, "that a breeder of dogs for the race track should be allowed his costs, depreciation, etc. while the father of the family is not."

Mahoney's thorough and lucid exposition of Jouvenel's thought is a most welcome addition to the Library of Modern Thinkers—a series edited by Jeffrey O. Nelson and published by the Intercollegiate Studies Institute—which includes works on the life and thought of Robert Nisbet, Ludwig von Mises, Wilhelm Roepke, and Eric Voegelin. ■

George W. Carey is Professor of Government at Georgetown University and author of A Student's Guide to American Political Thought.

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MUSIC

Homage to a Catalanian

By Ralph de Toledano

I WAS PUERTO RICO BOUND to do a story on its politics and economy when *Newsweek's* music editor, a busty Texan whose idea of reportage was to shout obscenities over the phone at the Met's Rudolf Bing, loomed over my desk. "If you can take time out when you're in San Juan," she said, "why don't you go talk to Pablo Casals? He's giving a concert down there." The concert was the Festival Casals—after the Prades Festival, his second break in a long self-exile from public performance in protest of the defeat of the Spanish loyalists.

I quickly agreed. Since my very young Juilliard days, I had written about music, but most of the musicians I had known were jazzmen. I had once chatted with Fritz Kreisler, but this was an opportunity to interview a musician of such tremendous stature as Mr. Cello. Getting to see him, once I was in San Juan, seemed like an impossibility. He had categorically refused to talk to the press. But when he learned that I was a friend of Gov. Luis Muñoz Marín, who had invited Casals to the island and treated him with respect and generosity, Casals made an exception. "If Toledano is a friend of Don Luis," he said, "I will talk to him."

Casals had vowed never to play in public until the fall of Francisco Franco. But as he approached 80, and though of iron constitution, he realized that he was not impervious to time's double-whammy. New techniques offered him the opportunity to record his great musicianship and his unsurpassed mastery of the cello. Casals was living in a small house off the beach at Punta las Arenas, a suburb of San Juan. As I entered, he was playing a passage from *The Well-*

Tempered Clavier at a small upright—a daily exercise to "refresh the spirit," said this stocky, balding, pot-bellied man, rimless glasses perched on his nose.

"You have a Spanish name," he said. "Does your family come from Toledo?" I answered, "*Hace cinco siglos*." He insisted that I speak to him in English and he to me in Spanish. My first question was to ask him about his change of heart in returning to performing. "It is always a sacrifice for a musician not to play," he said. Looking at the little red-and-yellow Catalan flag on his piano, he went on. "What right did I have to prosper when my people were persecuted in Spain? I could not understand why the Spanish people, and the Catalans too, should not be masters of their destiny. I said this to everyone, even to the King of England." But in time, his music called to him more imperatively. What bothered him was why the United States had recognized the Franco regime.

"The United States should have more dignity," he said, sounding like a character out of Hemingway's *For Whom the Bell Tolls*. "Dictators do terrible things. They kill. And killing has no dignity." He could not forgive Winston Churchill or

singing instrument. I let him proceed from Spain to his great passion, the music of Bach, "a miracle that cannot be found anywhere in art." He seemed to glow as he said, "to make eternal what is ephemeral, to make the divine human and the human divine—that is Bach." He had said this in almost the same words to a friend when he returned to performance. "Bach is a volcano. He was so ahead of his time that if he returned today, he would be considered a revolutionary." He moved on to speak, prophetically and decades ahead of his own time, of "Papa" Haydn, then held to be but a bridge between Bach and Beethoven.

"Haydn had an endless imagination and a great poetic spirit which went along with the solidity of his musical architecture. From our present musical chaos will come, I am sure, a rediscovery of a greatness which has been little recognized for so long. He is above any classification, and his power of invention—in his symphonies, in his Masses, in everything he wrote—was above that of any other composer, and it makes his music a constant surprise. No matter how many times you hear it or play it,

I COULD NOT ARGUE WITH **THE MAN WHO HAD SEIZED THE CELLO, THE CRUELEST OF INSTRUMENTS, AND MADE OF IT A NEW AND SINGING INSTRUMENT. I LET HIM PROCEED FROM SPAIN TO HIS GREAT PASSION, THE MUSIC OF BACH.**

Franklin Roosevelt for allowing Francisco Franco to triumph. I respected his assertion that he possessed a "moral independence," that he was "no politician but an artist who tries to keep faith with his human principles." But I had come to talk about music, about his artistry. I had my own feelings about the Spanish war, my support and later disillusionment, about the deaths of those who had gone to Spain to fight fascism only to be destroyed by fascism's first cousin.

I could not argue with the man who had seized the cello, the cruelest of instruments, and made of it a new and

you find something new in it." Years later, as Haydn's greatness was taken up by critics, the scope of his music and the purity of his Masses was acknowledged, I would remember the depth of Casals's conviction and enthusiasm. I said little as Pablo Casals talked, but my silent response must have been eloquent because Casals concluded the interview by inviting me to the final rehearsal of the Festival.

At the rehearsal, the orchestra was running through Mozart's *Symphony in A-Major* and Casals was happily swinging his baton and his body to the music, singing along *à la* Toscanini, though in

better voice. In the Andante, he suddenly put down the baton and almost staggeringly walked off the stage, fighting the pain of his heart attack until he was in his dressing room, where he collapsed. As he was carried out on a stretcher, he turned his head to look into the concert hall and murmured, "*Qué lastima, qué lastima, qué maravillosa orquesta.*" I was the only member of the press there, but *Newsweek's* music editor was too busy shouting at Rudolf Bing to run my story.

Pablo Casals's peasant strength carried him through, and he returned to the concert hall and to recording. But that encounter had cut deep for me, and I began listening analytically to his playing. Few musicians respected the composer's intent as much as Casals. The performer, he felt, had to work symbiotically with the composer, perhaps arriving at a new understanding. "Sometimes looking at a score I say to myself, 'What marvelous music. But I must *make* it so.' You must know how to vary repeated passages, and remember two very simple things: that the natural origin of melody was vocal and that rhythms come from the natural movements of man, from steps and from the dance." This sense made his *rubato*—the stealing of a beat from

one measure to the next as in speech or singing—so expressive and so natural. "It is not given to everyone to know how to play the first note" of a work, he would say. It was not a question of technique but of a sensitivity too subtle to define.

Casals brought to the cello not only an awesome muscular strength and technique, based on endless practicing, but an encompassing approach. If you listen carefully, particularly in the Beethoven Sonatas for Cello and Piano, which he recorded with Rudolf Serkin, or the Schubert trios of the Prades Festival (all on Columbia), you will notice that he uses the *vibrato* as an instrument of delineation. The passages that contribute to the melodic unfolding are played with a marked *vibrato*, whereas in other passages it is almost nonexistent. He had total control of his bow. The pressure and movement are fabulously even, at heel or tip of the bow, producing his delicate *pianissimi* and powerful *fortissimi*—achieved by fingers, wrist, and arm, all joined as if by God. His fingering he developed for himself, and it revolutionized cello technique.

The composer-critic Virgil Thomson was very close to the mark when he said that cello performance in our time

derived exclusively from Casals. And he had a personal relationship with his instrument. "I have a very great affection for the strings of my cello and I keep them as long as possible," he said. "If one breaks before a concert, I have to do a lot of preparation in order to learn the characteristics of the new string." Isaac Stern would have agreed.

The records that Pablo Casals made over the years have been reissued on CD, all with that excellence, that color and tonal variety, that intuition and perception of what the written notes meant, which illuminated his every performance. This is so true in the Casals recordings of the six Bach Suites for Cello Unaccompanied (reissued by Angel from the old HMV masters). The suites are much music—taxing instrument, performer, and audience. But if it is not *lèse majesté* to say it, they can sometimes be great room-emptiers. You must be able to shut out everything but the architectonics of the score. Casals triumphs over this Baroque obstacle course, entirely because the unflagging power and sensibility of his playing will not release you. Interestingly, his preference when listening to his own recordings was to play them at a speed faster than that at which they were recorded, a tone or a tone and a half sharper. Play Beethoven's last sonatas at 45 RPM instead of at 33 RPM and you will understand why.

Casals recovered from his heart attack and continued to play. He married one of his students, a 20-year-old, sulky-looking Puerto Rican girl. Until his death, it seemed as if time had not touched him. As a Spaniard, he thought first of dignity. But for this thought, his genius, and the little red-and-yellow Catalan flag, he would not have been Pablo Casals. ■

Ralph de Toledano is a former editor of Newsweek and the author or editor of over 20 books, including Notes From the Underground: the Whittaker Chambers-Ralph de Toledano Letters, 1949-1960.

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Flush Newsweek



I can think of many books other than the Koran to flush down a toilet, beginning with anything supposedly written by either Bill or Hillary Clinton, all

works by Kitty Kelley, everything by James Joyce, Philip Roth's *Plot Against America*, and *My Life So Far* by Jane Fonda, just for starters. But books are not the subject of this particular column. Anonymous sources are.

If the *Newsweek* story was bull, it shouldn't have been published. And if *Newsweek* had reason to believe the story, it shouldn't have been retracted. In any case, the story about the Koran has been around since last August, which makes for bad and late journalism on the part of the weekly.

The lawyers for three British "citizens," held in Guantanamo and since released, circulated a dossier about the so-called Tipton Three—Asef Iqbal, Ruhul Ahmed, and Shafiq Rasul (names straight out of central casting, if you ask me)—which included all sorts of incredible tortures and humiliations forced upon their clients, including the kicking around of the Koran. The trouble is, I don't believe a word British citizens with names like Shafiq Rasul tell their lawyers. In fact, I don't believe a word British lawyers say. Score a bad journalism point against this Isikoff fellow, obviously straining for a Pulitzer he is not about to get any time soon, but he does, however, deserve the Sidi Mohamed Bouf Kaka award—also known as the Flying Carpet prize—for trusting the Iqbals and Rasuls of this world.

Newsweek and above all its parent publication, the *Washington Post*, have always been more interested in scoring partisan points and taking part in trivial Washington turf wars while hiding behind anonymous sources than being truthful.


It was, of course, those two intrepid reporters, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, the inventors of modern journalism, who perfected the art of the anonymous source and the malign leak in order to discredit and demonize political opponents. Far from being aggressive investigative reporters doggedly uncovering the misdeeds of government officials, journalists for the most part take their cue from Woodward and lazily allow themselves to be used by government officials and other interested parties as passive transmission belts for bogus stories. The media's credulous acceptance of the neocons' and other government officials' ludicrous claims about Iraq's supposed weapons of mass destruction is just the most recent example of journalism by leak.

Some years ago, my old friend Edward Jay Epstein wrote a terrific article that concluded that Woodward and Bernstein had nothing to do with "uncovering" Watergate. They merely played the role of passive conduits for government officials who had a variety of grievances against Richard Nixon. (Woodstein wrote at length about a nonentity named Donald Segretti, whom they believed held the key to Watergate. It was a false trail. The FBI was trying to get rid of its liberal head, L. Patrick Gray, ergo the release of the "302" files.) But Woodward, Katherine Graham, Ben Bradlee, and the rest were only too eager to publish anything, however scurrilous, just to get Nixon. This was the contribution of the *Washington Post*—not investigative journalism but demonization and the destruction of reputation. Nixon was not their kind of person.

And thus a fraudulent history was manufactured to explain the eventual overthrow of Nixon, who was hated by phony liberals like the Grahams posing as upper-class WASPs. Yet it was Nixon who proposed a federally guaranteed minimum income, it was Nixon who created the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and modern managed healthcare. And, of course, it was Nixon who brought to an end America's painful involvement in Vietnam, an involvement massively and frivolously expanded by Kennedy and Johnson, poster boys for the social-climbing owners of the *Washington Post* Company.

According to *Post*-style liberals, we are supposed to shudder at the mention of Nixon's name. He asked, horror of horrors, the CIA to lean on the FBI to curtail their investigation of the Watergate break-in. What a monstrous desecration of the oath of office of president. Overthrowing and murdering South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem, as Kennedy did, fell well within the purview of the oath of office. Clinton bombed Iraq, Sudan, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan, all without pretense of legal sanction, causing untold damage and human suffering. George W. Bush invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, also illegally, with close to 100,000 deaths and counting. Nixon ended a war and improved the lives of countless Americans, yet he is treated as Stalin and Hitler rolled into one. For this historical falsification we must thank the egregious Katherine Graham (thankfully no longer with us) and all the brave boy and girl reporters of the *Washington Post*. Compared to what they did to a president who carried 49 states, reporting a phony story about the Koran is small beer indeed, as they say in Blighty. ■

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